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iQUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Does the Takings Clause authorize a court to
invalidate state rent control or land use regulatory legis-
lation on its face, without regard to whether it diminishes
economic value or use or causes any physical invasion of
the plaintiff's property, when the court concludes that the
statute does not substantially advance a legislative pur-
pose?
2. Does the facial constitutional validity of state
legislation depend on whether a federal court predicts
that it will achieve its objective?
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
The parties to the proceedings below were petitioners
Benjamin J. Cayetano, the Governor of Hawaii, and Earl I.
Anzai, the Attorney General of Hawaii, and respondent
Chevron USA, Inc. Earl I. Anzai was substituted below
for his predecessor as Attorney General, Margery S. Bron-
ster, pursuant'to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ......................... i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS ................. ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................ iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................... iv
OPINIONS BELOW ................................1
.JURISDICTION .................................... 1
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTE
INVOLVED ..................................... 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................... 2
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ........... 5
I. The Ninth Circuit's Rule That The Validity Of
Property Regulation Be Analyzed Under The
Takings Clause Raises An Important Issue
Which This Court Has Recognized As Unsettled
And Conflicts With Decisions By State Supreme
Courts And By The Court Of Federal Claims.. 5
II. The Ninth Circuit Adopted A Standard Of Review
That Requires Courts To Evaluate The Wisdom Of
State Legislation Contrary To Fundamental Consti-
ttutional Principles And In Conflict With The Deci-
sions Of Other Federal Courts Of Appeals And
State Supreme Courts .......................... 15
IIl. Review Should Be Granted Because This Case
Presents An Important And Clear-Cut Issue
That Has Present Consequences For States In
The Ninth Circuit And Will Control Further
Conduct Of This Case ........................ 22
CONCLUSION .................................... 24
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
FEDERAL CASES
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) ..... 17
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980)
................................... 6, 7, 10, 19, 21, 22
Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1996)
(en banc) .......................................... 5
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) ........ 12
Bamber v. United States, 45 Fed. C]. 162 (1999) ....... 10
Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549
(1911) ............................................ 18
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S.
432 (1985) ........................................ 16
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes of Monterey,
Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999) ..................... 8, 9, 20
Dolan v. City o] Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) ..... 8, 9, 11
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998)... 7, 13, 22
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County
of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) ............. 12, 13
Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed.
Cl. 21 (1999) ...................................... 10
Forsyth v. City of Hammond, 166 U.S. 506 (1897) ..... 23
Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148
(1964)............................................ 23
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) ................ 5
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229
(1984) ......................................... 17, 18
VTABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
John Corp. v. City of Houston, 214 F.3d 573 n.9 (5th
Cir. 2000) ...................................... 5, 11
Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470 (1987) ................................... 18
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) .............. 17
Loveladies Harbor v. United States, 15 CI Ct. 381
(1988) ............................................ 10
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997) ........... 23
Michael v. United States, 454 U.S. 950 (1981) ......... 23
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) .... 16
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) ...... 7
New Burnham Prairie Homes v. Village of Burnham,
910 F.2d 1474 (7th Cir. 1990) ...................... 21
New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) .... 19
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) ....... 19
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S.
825 (1987) .............................. 9, 11, 1% 20
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988) ......... 16
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968) .... 12
Presault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1 (1990) .................... 13
Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, 124 F.3d
1150 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 871
(1998) ...................................... 3, 14, 17
RRI Realty Corp. v. Incorporated Village of South-
hampton, 870 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1989) ............... 21
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) ..... 13
Sylvia Development Corp. v. Calvert County, Mary-
land, 48 F.3d 810 (4th Cir. 1995) ................... 21
United States v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373 (1945) .... 23
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) ........ 19
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) ...... 16
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926) .......................................... 6, 16
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) .... 18
Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. Of
Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981) ................... 17
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v.
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172
(1985) ............................................ 14
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) ........ 15
Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992) ...... 19, 20
S'rA_ CASES
Bonnie Briar Syndicate v. Mamaroneck, 721 N.E. 2d
971 (N.Y. 1999) ................................... 22
Brunelle v. Town of South Kingston, 700 A.2d 1075
n.5 (R.I. 1997) ..................................... 9
Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 720 P.2d 513 (Ariz.
1986)............................................. 13
Mission Springs Inc. v. City of Spokane, 954 P. 2d 250
(Wash. 1998) ...................................... 9
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 968 P. 2d
993 (Cal. 1999) ............................ 10, 11, 21
Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Authority v.
A.G.W.S. Corp., 640 So.2d 54 (Fla. 1994) ........... 14
t_ EDERAL STATUTES
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) .................................. 1
STATE STATGrl E'_
Act 257, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 486H-10.4 (1997) ... 2, 6, 16, 17
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Jerold Kayden, Land Use, Regulations, Rationality,
and Judicial Review: The RSVP in the Nollan Invi-
tation, 23 Urb. Law. 301 (1991) .................... 11
John Echeverria, Takings and Errors, 51 Ala. L. Rev.
1047 (2000) ....................................... 11
Toni Massuro, Reviving Hugo Black? The Court's
"Jot for Jot" Account of Substantive Due Process,
73 N.Y.L.Rev. 1086, 1100-03 (1998) ................. 5
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
,'ircuit is reported at 224 F.3d 1030, and is reprinted in
he appendix hereto, App. 1, below. The opinion of the
)istrict Court granting respondent's motion for summary
Jdgment is reported at 57 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (D. Haw.
998) and is reprinted at App, 43.
.0
JURISDICTION
The Ninth Circuit entered its judgment and opinion
.n September 13, 2000. Petitioner filed timely petitions
or reconsideration and for reconsideration en banc on
eptember 27, 2000. The Ninth Circuit denied these peti-
ions on October 26, 2000 and entered an amended order
.n October 31, 2000. App. 69-72.
The jurisdiction of this Court to review the decision
f the Ninth Circuit is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
._.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
AND STATUTE INVOLVED
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides in
elevant part: "No person shall be . . . deprived of life,
tberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
.rivate property be taken for public use, without iust
ompensation." The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in
ection 1: "[NJor shall any State deprive any person of
.fe, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws."
The relevant portion of Act 257, Haw. Rev. Star.
§ 486H-10.4 (1997), is reprinted at App. 73.
#
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Hawaii enacted Act 257 in 1997 to try to temper the
State's relatively high retail price of gasoline. Haw. Rev.
Star. § 486H-10.4. The Act limits the amount of rent that
oil distributors may charge gasoline retailers who lease
company-owned filling stations to 15% of gross profit
from gasoline sales and of gross revenue from sale of
other products. Chevron owns 64 stations in Hawaii,
which it leases to operators who sell Chevron gasoline at
retail.
Chevron filed suit in the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii against the Governor and Attor-
ney General of Hawaii, claiming that Act 257 facially
effects an unconstitutional regulatory taking and seeking
declaratory relief. Chevron moved for summary judg-
ment, advancing several arguments. The District Court
granted Chevron's motion, holding that the act constitu-
ted a regulatory taking because it failed to substantially
advance a legitimate government interest.
The District Court found that the station rent control
law was intended to be and was logically related to the
legitimate purpose of reducing retail gasoline prices.
App. 55-56. But the Court understood itself to be bound
by the precedents of the Ninth Circuit and of this Court
to apply a higher standard of scrutiny, captured in the
phrase "substantially advance" a legitimate government
interest. The Court reasoned that since the Act did not
regulate the sale of a station lease by an operator, the
lessee could capture a "premium" in the sale price,
reflecting the difference between the regulated and mar-
ket rents, and thus could defeat the goal of holding down
gasoline prices. The Court also concluded, somewhat
inconsistently, that there would be no savings (and no
premium), because Chevron could recover lost rent by
raising the price it charged the operator for gasoline. The
District Court expressly rejected the State's argument that
the proper standard of review was whether the legisla-
ture reasonably could have believed that the statute
would hold down retail gasoline prices. App. 52-54.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the District
Court had applied the correct standard but vacated the
grant of summary judgment and remanded for trial. The
Court of Appeals, too, rejected the State's argument that
the validity of a land use ordinance should be evaluated
under the traditional standard of the due process clause,
"whether 'the Legislature rationally could have believed
the Act would substantially advance a legitimate govern-
ment purpose.'" App. 6. The Court felt itself bound by
circuit precedent, Richardson v. City and County of Hon-
olulu, 124 F.3d 1150 (gth Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
871 (1998). The Court interpreted "substantially advance"
to "depend[ ] on whether it will in fact lead to lower fuel
prices." App. 24-25. Finding that the affidavits relied on
by the trial court did not clearly resolve this question, the
Court of Appeals remanded for a trial. It recognized that
the inquiry would deal with "questions of predictive fact,
rather than historical fact." App. 18. The Court expressly
found that the legislation does not deprive Chevron's
property of economic viability, noting that the legislation
allows it to charge "more than it would otherwise have
charged under its own rental program." App. 25.
Judge William Fletcher concurred in the result but
disagreed with the majority's analysis. App. 28. Within
the constraints of circuit precedent, he argued that the
court should have applied the more lenient due process
standard of reasonableness previously applied to rent
and price control legislation. App. 28, 37. He concluded:
I fear that under the majority opinion virtually
all rent control laws in the Ninth Circuit are
now subject to the "substantially advances a
legitimate state interest" test, and that this test
may invalidate many of these laws .... The
question before the judiciary is not the
advisability of rent control laws but rather their
constitutionality. Ever since its retreat from eco-
nomic substantive due process at the end of the
1930s, the Supreme Court has essentially left it
to the other branches of government to
decide . . . whether to adopt rent and price
controls." App. 40-41.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. The Ninth Circuit's Rule That the Validity of Prop-
erty Regulation be Analyzed Under the Takings
Clause Raises an Important Issue Which This Court
has Recognized as Unsettled and Conflicts with
Decisions by State Supreme Courts and by the Court
of Federal Claims.
Claims that legislation takes property from an owner,
by authorizing a permanent physical invasion or by
destroying its economic viability, properly invoke the
Takings Clause. By contrast, claims that state legislation
falls outside the police power, because it fails to ratio-
nally relate to a legitimate state purpose, long have been
considered under the Due Process Clause. Since 1996,
however, the Ninth Circuit has insisted that challenges to
the rationality and validity of land use regulation not
only may but must be analyzed under the Takings Clause,
rather than under the Due Process Clause. 1 Moreover, the
Ninth Circuit has made it clear that it will apply a higher
1 Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1996) (en
banc). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit interpreted this Court's
decision in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), to mean that
the "constitutional bar on "private takings" preempts [more
generalized] substantive due process claim[s]." Armendariz, 75
F.3d at 1322. Thus, challenges to the validity of land use
ordinances may be brought only under the Takings Clause.
Other circuits have rejected this view, e.g., John Corp. v. City of
Houston, 214 F.3d 573, 583 (Sth Cir. 2000), and it has been
severely criticized. See Toni Massaro, Reviving Hugo Black? The
Court's "]or For Jot" Account of Substantive Due Process, 73 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1086, 1100-03 (1998). This collateral issue would
disappear if this Court held, as it should, that challenges to the
reasonableness of legislation may not be brought under the
Takings Clause.
6standard of scrutiny when it reviews state legislation
under the Takings Clause than it would under the Due
Process Clause, although it has never presented any prin-
cipled justification for this much greater intrusion into
State democratic decision making. Such error and confu-
sion concerning core constitutional provisions require
prompt cure by this Court.
In this case, the court below held that Hawaii's Act
257 must be found to violate the Takings Clause if the
trial court finds that it will not "substantially advance"
the state's legitimate purpose of reducing the retail price
of gasoline. The Ninth Circuit's decision clearly commits
that court to use of the Takings Clause for second guess-
ing the wisdom of virtually all state and local legislation
regulating land, bringing doctrinal confusion in this area
to an appalling level and endangering the relationship
between federal courts and state governments. This Court
needs to resolve this confusion and restore the appropri-
ate and traditional deference that federal courts show
state legislation addressing social and economic prob-
lems.
This Court has not authoritatively resolved whether
challenges to the means - ends rationality of legislation
may be resolved under the Takings Clause. Indeed, con-
tradictory indications by the Court may have fostered the
confusion that now reigns in the lower courts, making
timely guidance from this Court particularly appropriate.
Of course, this Court authored the long line of cases
establishing that arbitrary legislation violates due proc-
ess. E.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,
395 (1926). The confusion stems from Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), where the Court, while
unanimously upholding a large lot zoning ordinance
against a facial challenge, stated that a taking occurs
where the law "does not substantially advance legitimate
state interests." For that proposition, the Agins opinion,
issued near the end of the 1979 Term, cites only a due
process decision, Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183,
188 (1928). Although the Court has quoted Agins subse-
quently, it neither has explained its meaning nor ever
struck down a regulation as a taking for failing this test.
It is high time the Court clarify that the Agins formulation
amounts only to inadvertent dicta.
The Court has given several indications that it is
ready to do so. Indeed, in Eastern Enterprises v. ApfeI, 524
U.S. 498 (1998), even though the Court struck down retro-
active health care liability legislation, five justices stated
that questions about the legitimacy of economic legisla-
tion should be addressed under the Due Process, rather
than under the Takings Clause. Id. at 545-6 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); id. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Ken-
nedy explicitly noted the "uneasy tension" between his
view and the Agins test. Id. at 545. He concluded: "Given
that the constitutionality of the Coal Act appears to turn
on the legitimacy of the Congress' judgment rather than
on the availability of compensation . . . the more appro-
priate constitutional analysis arises under general due
process principles rather than under the Takings Clause."
Id. Justice Breyer, for four dissenters, wrote, "As this
language [of the Takings Clause] suggests, at the heart of
the Clause lies a concern, not with preventing arbitrary or
unfair government action, but with providing compensa-
tion for legitimate government action that takes 'private
property' to serve the 'public' good." Id. at 554 (emphasis
8in original). Even if these congruent conclusions from five
justices do not technically constitute a holding with
which the Ninth Circuit is in conflict, it does indicate that
a majority of the Court rejects the linchpin of the decision
below.
The Court also raised but expressly did not settle the
appropriateness of the "substantially advance" test for a
takings challenge in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes of
Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 704 (1999). In Del Monte
Dunes, the Court affirmed liability based on an instruc-
tion permitting the jury to decide whether denial of a
permit related to a legislative interest, without deciding
whether the Takings Clause authorized such an instruc-
tion, because the defendant had explicitly agreed to the
instruction. In this case, by contrast, defendants contested
the standard for review in both the Court of Appeals and
the District Court. App. 6, 52. In addition to the Court,
the authors of the separate opinions went out of their
ways to "express no view;" Del Monte Dunes at 732 n.2
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment), and "offer no opinion," id. at 753 n.12 (Souter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), about whether
the Agins test was correct. Plainly, the justices view this
question as open and timely.
Del Monte Dunes also made clear the important ana-
lytical distinction between exaction cases and regulation
cases. The Court has required that transfers of physical
possession or ownership from a private owner to the
government in exchange for approval of a development
plan, referred to generally as exactions, both "substan-
tially advance" and be "roughly proportional" to the
goals of the relevant legislation. Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,
483 U.S. 825 (1987). But these cases address the discreet
and sensitive question of when a permit condition can
effect an actual physical occupation without resulting in a
taking and have no logical bearing on when a regulation
becomes so burdensome as to effect a taking. The Court
confirmed in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Mon-
terey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702-03 (1999), that the rough
proportionality test of Dolan had been fashioned for exac-
tions and had no role in assessing regulations of use. The
same logic requires the conclusion that the substantially
advance test of Nollan has no role in reviewing a regula-
tion. Without the transfer of physical possession there is
neither need nor justification for a higher level of scru-
tiny of the state's reason for its action. Thus, in another
useful way, the Court recently has shed light on the error
below.
In sum, all nine justices recently have authored or
joined opinions admitting the need for clarification of this
important issue. Thus, the Court has identified and
framed the question here cleanly presented, making this
an unusually compelling case for the grant of certiorari.
The Ninth Circuit's approach directly conflicts with
decisions by the Rhode Island and Washington Supreme
Courts squarely holding that challenges to the rationality
of land use regulation must be brought under the Due
Process, not the Takings Clause. Brunelle v. Town of South
Kingston, 700 A.2d 1075, 1083-84 n.5 (R.I. 1997) ("IT]he
arbitrariness or capriciousness of a particular state action
is properly examined under the light of the Fourteenth
Amendment due process clause and not the Fifth Amend-
ment takings clause."); Mission Springs Inc. v. City of
10
Spokane, 954 P.2d 250, 258 (Wash. 1998). No doubt more
courts would be in conflict with the decision if they did
not feel bound by the Court's pronouncement in Agins.
The Ninth Circuit rule also squarely conflicts with a
long line of decisions by the United States Court of Fed-
eral Claims, which has jurisdiction over all takings claims
for just compensation against the United States under the
Tucker Act. That Court has consistently held that chal-
lenges as to whether legislation "substantially advances"
a government interest cannot be entertained under the
Takings Clause and fall outside that court's jurisdiction.
Bamber v. United States, 45 Fed. CI. 162, 165 (1999); Florida
Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. C1. 21, 42
(1999); Loveladies Harbor v. United States, 15 CI. Ct. 381,
390 (1988), aff'd, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("[N]o court
has ever found a taking has occurred solely because a
state interest was not legitimately advanced . . . "). The
Claims Court's refusal to hear challenges to the validity
of federal legislation may reflect its sensitivity to limita-
tions on the liability of the United States under the Tucker
Act.
The confusion below extends beyond these direct
conflicts as lower courts have struggled to make sense of
the Court's inconclusive statements. In Santa Monica
Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 968 P.2d 993 (Cal. 1999),
where the California Supreme Court upheld a rent con-
trol ordinance against a facial takings challenge, Justice
Kennard explicitly requested this Court to resolve the
confusion sown by Agins:
[R]ecently, Justice Kennedy of the United States
Supreme Court has questioned the appropriate-
ness of using a means ends test as the measure
11
of whether a taking has occurred .... Outside
the Nollan/Dolan context, should a means-ends
test be used to determine whether a taking has
occurred, or instead should means end testing
remain within due process jurisprudence? Only
the high court can resolve this question and,
given the importance of this area of law, I
respectfully suggest that it do so when the
opportunity next arises.
ld. at 1012-13 (Kennard, J., concurring).2 See also John Corp
v. City of Houston, 214 F.3d 573, 579 n.9 (5th Cir. 2000)
(avoiding "knotty issue" of whether claim that govern-
ment action failed to advance a public purpose should be
brought under Due Process or Takings Clause). Commen-
tators have argued for years that it is anomalous to test
the validity of legislation under the Takings Clause. John
Echeverria, Takings and Errors, 51 Ala. L. Rev. 1047 (2000);
Jerold Kayden, Land Use, Regulations, Rationality, and Judi-
cial Review: The RSVP in the Nonan Invitation, 23 Urb.
Law. 301 (1991).
The Ninth Circuit's insistence on testing the ratio-
nality of state legislation under the Takings Clause
plunges litigants into a host of logical and practical prob-
lems. Certainly, the most harmful effect has been the
heightened level of scrutiny applied to economic legisla-
tion just because land is the asset being regulated. The
2 Justice Brown, who dissented, echoed the plea of Justice
Kennard: "If such measures [i.e., rent control ordinances] are
capable of withstanding a Nollan-inspired takings clause
analysis, the high court ought to tell us so, probably sooner
rather than later." Santa Monica Beach, Ltd., supra, 968 P.2d at
1047.
12
difference in standard between regulation of land and of
other contractual or property assets seems particularly
indefensible in this case, where Chevron both leases land
and sells gasoline to the retailer. Hawaii's regulation of
rent is subject to demanding review under the Takings
Clause, but a regulation of wholesale gasoline prices
would be considered under the more generous standard
of the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Permian Basin Area
Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 769-70 (1968). No reasoned justi-
fication for decreasing dramatically the scope of legisla-
tive discretion to regulate commercial real estate as
opposed to other business assets has ever been offered.
We address this issue at length below under the heading
of the next argument.
The Due Process Clause serves as a substantive limit
on governmental power; laws found in violation gener-
ally are held invalid. The Takings Clause, by contrast, "is
designed not to limit governmental interference with
property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in
the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a
taking." First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County
of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) (emphasis in
original). Legislation challenged as invalid may impose
quite minor burdens on a property owner, as the Ninth
Circuit found was the case here, App. 25, which in no
way resemble the severe losses targeted by the Takings
Clause. Arbitrary legislation does not raise the funda-
mental question of whether it forces "some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice
should be borne by the public as a whole." Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). Arbitrary legislation
imposes burdens that no one should bear.
13
Entertaining challenges to the validity of legislation
under the Takings Clause raises perplexing questions
about remedy. The constitutionally required remedy for a
regulatory taking is an award of just compensation. First
English, supra, 482 U.S. 314-22. But it is difficult to under-
stand what constitutes "just compensation" when the
fault of the law is that it does not achieve its objectives,
since this fault bears no economic relationship to the
property owner's loss, if any.
Respondents here sued seeking declaratory relief.
But this Court has repeatedly held that "[e]quitable relief
is not available to enjoin an alleged taking of private
property for public use, duly authorized by law, when a
suit for compensation can be brought against the sover-
eign subsequent to the taking." Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984); see also Presault v. ICC, 494
U.S. 1, 11-17 (1990). The plurality in Eastern Enterprises,
supra, strove to fashion an exception to this rule when the
payment of compensation by government would be non-
sensical, as it would be here, 524 U.S. at 519-22, but the
need to improvise such an exception and its uncertain
scope suggest the continuing problems of jamming
square pegs in round holes. Similarly, some courts have
limited plaintiffs' "temporary takings" damages, after a
statute has been held invalid under the Takings Clause, to
damages based on "actual losses," the measure that
would have been used if the case had been brought under
the Due Process Clause, rather than "compensation for
the period during which the taking was effective." First
English, supra, 482 U.S. at 321. See, e.g., Corrigan v. City of
14
Scottsdale, 720 P. 2d 513, 518-19 (Ariz. 1986). Paying com-
pensation often would confer windfalls on owners. 3
Moreover, because the public, by definition, does not
benefit from arbitrary legislation, the fairness argument
for compensation by taxpayers fails. 4
The issue presented here is among the most impor-
tant that the Court can resolve at this time. The Ninth
Circuit's rule subjects virtually all state and local govern-
ment regulation touching land in the western third of the
United States to illogical and unjustifiably intense judicial
3 In Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Authority v.
A.G.W.S. Corp., 640 So.2d 54 (Fla. 1994), the Florida Supreme
Court initially had held that the state highway department's
authority to mark the location of future roads on an official map
constituted a taking because it did not advance a legitimate
state interest. After trial courts began to permit affected
property owners jury trials on compensation for temporary
takings, with no preliminary showing of any economic injury,
the Court changed the doctrinal basis for its invalidation to the
Due Process Clause to limit indemnification to those who
actually suffered damage.
4 The Ninth Circuit also has felt compelled to create an
exception from the finality rules of Williamson County Regional
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172
(1985) for regulatory takings claims brought under the
"substantially advance" rubric. Because such claims do not
depend on how much economic value is left in the plaintiff's
property or the extent to which it has been compensated, but on
the effectiveness of the legislation, they are considered
immediately ripe. Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, 123
F.3d 1150, 1165 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 871 (1998).
This exception further demonstrates the illogic of addressing
issues of validity under a constitutional provision concerned
with compensation for what the government takes away for
valid reasons.
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second-guessing, fomenting extensive, expensive litiga-
tion under a fundamentally incoherent constitutional
doctrine. This Court should take responsibility for clear-
ing up this dangerous confusion, having recognized that
Agins is problematic and is creating havoc in the lower
courts. This Court can save all lower courts from trouble-
some confusion and wasted effort by now making it clear
that challenges to the means ends rationality of legisla-
tion should be brought under the Due Process and not the
Takings Clause.
II. The Ninth Circuit Adopted a Standard of Review
That Requires Courts to Evaluate the Wisdom of
State Legislation Contrary to Fundamental Consti-
tutional Principles and in Conflict with the Deci-
sions of Other Federal Courts of Appeal and State
Supreme Courts.
Whether challenges to the validity of state land use
regulation are adjudicated under the Due Process Clause,
as we urge, or under the Takings Clause, the standard of
review is crucial to maintaining a proper balance between
democratic governance and the rule of law. Since at least
the 1930's, this Court generally has employed a rational
relationship test for Due Process and Equal Protection
Clause challenges to social and economic legislation.
Under this test, the Court upholds legislation that a ratio-
nal legislator could have believed would advance a per-
missible public purpose. E.g., WilIiamson v. Lee Optical,
348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955). The Court has exercised
"strict scrutiny" in cases where legislation touches upon
certain "fundamental interests," so that the legislation
will be held invalid unless the state can show that it is
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necessary to advance a compelling state interest. E.g.,
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977)
(occupancy statute struck down for burdening interests of
members of extended family in living together). Some
few cases may fall in an intermediate category, where the
interests affected are unusually important but not funda-
mental and where a tighter fit between means and ends
must be demonstrated than in rational basis cases. See
e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432
(1985). Although the Court has divided over how to
determine which interests require a higher level of scru-
tiny, this basic structure has been remarkably consistent.
Land use regulation has long been considered social
and economic regulation subject to rational basis scrutiny.
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974); Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). And
the validity of rent control laws, when not confiscatory,
has been subject to invalidation only when "arbitrary;
discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy
the legislature is free to adopt." Pennell v. City of San Jose,
485 U.S. 1, 11 (1988). Experts dispute whether or under
what conditions rent control laws are efficacious. But the
wisdom of this long line of cases is that the usefulness of
a rent control or other land use laws is a question that
should be decided by the people through their elected
representatives and not by judges.
In this case, the Ninth Circuit held that Act 257 must
"substantially advance" the public interest, that legisla-
tion "substantially advances" an interest if it "bears a
reasonable relationship" to that interest, and that
"[w}hether Act 257's rent cap is reasonably related to its
objective of lowering fuel prices certainly depends on
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whether it will in fact lead to lower fuel prices." op at 14.
This standard affords the decision of the Hawaii legisla-
ture no deference at all. It instructs the trial judge to void
the statute if, based upon testimony concerning "predic-
tive facts," a telling oxymoron, he predicts that the Act
will not work. This Court should not permit lower federal
courts to exercise such supervisory power over the merits
of state legislative decisions. Such a judicial role resem-
bles far too closely that prevalent during the discredited
Lochner era, when courts struck down maximum hour
legislation because they did not think that it would pro-
tect the health of workers or minimum wage legislation
because they did not think it would improve the eco-
nomic position of workers. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S,
45 (1905); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
The court below should have instructed the trial
court to uphold Act 257 only if there is no possibility that
it can achieve a lawful objective. "[W]hether in fact the
provision will accomplish its objectives is not the ques-
tion: the [constitutional requirement] is satisfied
if . . . the . . . [state] Legislature rationally could have
believed that the [Act] would promote its objective."
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242
(1984) quoting Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd.
of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 671-72 (1981) (emphasis in
original). 5 It is bedrock constitutional law, that "[e]ven if
s The Ninth Circuit argues that Midkiff is irrelevant,
because a lower standard of rationality is appropriate in a case
involving expropriation and payment of compensation.
Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, 124 E3d 1150, 1158
(9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 871 (1998). This argument is
weak. First, it ignores that the Midkiff Court expressly equated
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the wisdom of the policy be regarded as debatable and its
effects uncertain, still the legislature is entitled to its
judgment." West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937). In this case, the district court held that providing a
flexible maximum rent logically aimed at reducing gas-
oline prices (App. 55-6), but did not substantially
advance that goal, making clear that the court used a
raised standard. Both the District Court and Ninth Circuit
explicitly rejected Hawaii's argument that the lower, tra-
ditional level of scrutiny should be used. App. 6-7, 52-54.
But this Court long ago stated the correct view:
"Whether the enactment is wise or unwise,
whether it is based on sound economic theory,
whether it is the best means to achieve the
desired result, whether, in short, the legislative
discretion within its prescribed limits should be
exercised in a particular manner, are matters for
the iudgment of the legislature, and the earnest
conflict of serious opinion does not suffice to
bring them within the range of judicial cogni-
zance." Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219
U.S. 549, 569 (1911).
Federal court scrutiny of state social and economic
legislation at this level of intrusiveness, not only violates
the scope of the legislature's discretion under the eminent
domain power with that under the police power, 467 U.S. at 240.
Second, the argument illogically advocates a higher level of
scrutiny for the validity of legislation having a smaller
interference with the owner's control of his property. Chief
Justice Rehnquist has argued that Midkiff provides the right
standard for assessing regulatory legislation. Keystone
Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictfs, 480 U.S. 470, 511 n.3
(1987) (dissenting opinion).
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long accepted understandings of the distinct roles of
judges and elected representatives, it tramples on impor-
tant virtues of federalism. The sovereign powers of the
states can be impaired as surely by federal judges wield-
ing expansive interpretations of vague constitutional pro-
visions as by Congress passing the limits on its
enumerated powers or commandeering state agencies, as
in, for example, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000) and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
The Court wisely has long heeded the admonition of
Justice Brandeis that open-ended review under the Four-
teenth Amendment poses a special threat when a state
may "serve as a laboratory" trying "novel social and
economic experiments," because broad, non-textual
review makes it easy to "erect our prejudices into legal
principles." New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 280,
311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). State experimenta-
tion simply is not possible if a federal judge has the
authority to decide, on the basis of expert testimony
about "predictive facts," whether a new state law "will in
fact lead to lower fuel prices." App. 25. This approaches
placing a state legislature into federal receivership.
The Ninth Circuit has not offered any reasoned justi-
fication for imposing a more demanding standard on land
use or rent control regulation. The court below followed
its own Richardson precedent, also striking down a rent
control provision, which mechanically quoted the "sub-
stantially advance" language from Agins and drew an
expansive command from this Court's decision in Yee v.
City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992). In Yee, the Court did
suggest in dicta that rent control laws could be amenable
to the "substantially advance" test restated in Nollan v.
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California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), but
such authority hardly justifies the intrusive measurement
of efficacy directed here. First, Nollan actually employed a
quite deferential standard, requiring only a "logical
nexus" between a regulation and goal, something found
by the District Court to be present here. App. 55-56.
Moreover, to the extent Nollan requires greater scrutiny,
DeI Monte Dunes has made it apparent that Nollan applies
only to permanent physical occupations, not mere regula-
tions, as explained above, at 9.
Yee also suggested that the ability of a tenant to
capture the difference between regulated rent and market
rent in conveying his leasehold to a new tenant "might
have some bearing" on whether the ordinance was valid.
503 U.S. at 530. Hawaii does not dispute that lessees'
capture of regulatory savings should be considered in
assessing the rationality of the statute. But Yee nowhere
even hints that the ability of a lessee to convey his inter-
est ipso facto elevates the scrutiny to which the statute is
subject or casts onto the state a duty to prove that the
ordinance will work.
The Ninth Circuit explicitly ruled that all land use
regulation must meet this test. Its decisions stand in stark
conflict with many decisions in other circuits employing a
highly deferential standard in Due Process challenges to
state and local government land use regulations, includ-
ing rent control ordinances. The Fourth Circuit, for exam-
pie, has stated that challenges to land use laws "can
survive only if the alleged purpose behind the state
action has no conceivable rational relationship to the
exercise of the state's traditional police power through
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zoning." Sylvia Developmen! Corp. v. Calvert County, Mary-
land, 48 F.3d 810, 827 (4th Cir. 1995}. The Seventh Circuit
even requires a property owner to show that an adverse
zoning decision not only is arbitrary and irrational, but
also show the violation of another constitutional right or
that state law does not provide an adequate remedy. New
Burnham Prairie Homes v. Village of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474,
1481 (7th Cir. 1990). It would be difficult to overstate the
aversion of most lower federal courts to open-ended
review of local land use decisions under standards such
as endorsed by the Ninth Circuit here. See, e.g., RRI Realty
Corp. v. Incorporated Village of Southhampton, 870 F.2d 54
(2d Cir. 1989) (refusing to entertain substantive due pro-
cess challenge to denial of permit unless plaintiff prelimi-
narily can show an entitlement to it under state law).
The Ninth Circuit's ruling also conflicts directly with
important recent decisions by the highest courts of Cali-
fornia and New York interpreting the Agins "substantially
advance" formula so as to preserve traditional legislative
discretion. In Santa Monica Beach, supra, the California
Supreme Court sustained the granting of a demurrer to a
takings challenge to a city rent control law, where the
plaintiff wished to try to show that the law failed to
achieve its goals, the factual inquiry ordered by the Ninth
Circuit in this case. The Court stated: "In sum, with rent
control, as with most other such social and economic
legislation, we leave to legislative bodies rather than to
the courts to evaluate whether the legislation has fallen
so far short of its goals as to warrant repeal or amend-
ment." 968 P.2d at 1007. The conflict over respective
willingness to second guess legislation between the Ninth
Circuit and the California Supreme Court will draw
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floods of litigants into federal as opposed to state courts
in our largest state. Similarly, the New York Court of
Appeals, in "easily" sustaining a town's zoning amend-
ments, held that the Agins means-ends test only requires
that land use laws bear a "reasonable relationship" to
legitimate objectives, an approach indistinguishable from
traditional due process analysis. Bonnie Briar Syndicate v.
Mamaroneck, 721 N.E. 2d 971 (N.Y. 1999).
Justice Kennedy recently lamented that "It]he impre-
cision of our regulatory takings doctrine does open the
door to normative considerations about the wisdom of
government decisions." Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524
U.S. 498, 539, 545 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). This is a case where the Ninth Cir-
cuit's interpretation requires federal courts to strike
down legislation when it concludes that elected legisla-
tors have made an unwise estimate of the benefits of
legislation. This Court urgently needs to restore the cor-
rect balance between federal judicial power and state
political processes.
Ill. Review Should Be Granted Because This Case Pre-
sents an Important and Clear-Cut Issue That Has
Present Consequences for States in the Ninth Cir-
cuit and Will Control Further Conduct of This
Case.
The Court should grant review in this case, even
though the Ninth Circuit remanded for a trial. The Ninth
Circuit has clearly and finally established the legal stan-
dard to be applied, and it is cleanly presented for review
in this case. Subsequent litigation will subject Hawaii to
the need to defend the wisdom of its legislation and the
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prescience of its legislators. As in United States v. General
Motors, 323 U.S. 373, 377 (1945), another takings case
where the Court of Appeals had remanded for trial under
a troubling legal standard, the decision below is "funda-
mental to the further conduct of the case." See also Gil-
lespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 153 (1964).
That the standard adopted below conflicts with
numerous decision of this and other courts, as we show
above, provides further reason for immediate review. For-
syth v. City of Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 514-15 (1897);
accord, General Motors, 323 U.S. at 374; Michael v. United
States, 454 U.S. 950, 951 (1981) (White, J., dissenting).
Most importantly, the issue is important and has
present consequences for Hawaii and other states.
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 975-76 (1997). The
Ninth Circuit rule subjects land use and rent control
legislation over the western part of the United States to
intrusive federal court oversight in violation of principles
of both separation of powers and federalism. As a result,
it invites a plethora of inappropriate and expensive litiga-
tion challenging the efficacy of many state and local laws.
The lower courts struggle in present confusion about the
governing principles. The Court would not serve well
either the states or the lower courts to postpone decision
on these issues until the conclusion of trial and further
appeal in this case.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this petition for certiorari
should be granted.
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OPINION
BEEZER, Circuit Judge:
Hawaii Governor Benjamin J. Cayetano and Attorney
General Earl I. Anzai (collectively "the State") appeal the
district court's judgment in favor of Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
Chevron filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief
against enforcement of Section 3(c) of Act 257 of the 1997
Hawaii State Legislature ("Act 257"). Act 257, inter alia,
proscribes the maximum rent that oil companies can col-
lect from dealers who lease company-owned service sta-
tions. Both parties moved for summary judgment on
whether the maximum permissible regulated rent effects
an unconstitutional regulatory taking. After concluding
that it does, the district court granted Chevron's motion
and denied the State's motion. The State appeals only the
grant of summary judgment to Chevron; it does not
appeal the denial of its own motion. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because genuine issues of mate-
rial fact exist, we vacate the judgment and remand for
further proceedings.
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I
In response to concerns about the highly concen-
trated gasoline market in Hawaii and the resulting high
cost of gasoline to consumers, the Hawaii Legislature
enacted Act 257 on June 21, 19973 Act 257, inter alia,
regulates the maximum rent an oil company can charge
dealers who lease its service stations.
Chevron is one of two gasoline refiners and one of six
wholesalers in Hawaii. At the retail level, Chevron sells
most of its gasoline through company-owned stations,
which are leased to independent dealers. Chevron leases
64 service stations to dealers in Hawaii. From 1984
through the end of 1996, Chevron relied on estimated
gasoline sales to calculate the rent owed by the lessee
dealers. After determining that the amount of gross rent
receipts was not satisfactor); Chevron initiated a new
nationwide dealer rental program in January 1997. Chev-
ron restructured the manner in which it calculated lease
rates. This program, which the parties agree would be in
effect in Hawaii absent Act 257, requires the lessee dealer
to pay a monthly rent, consisting of an escalating percent-
age of the dealer's gross margin on actual, rather than
estimated, gasoline sales. For instance, the rent would be
calculated as 18% of the gross margin up to $18,000; 32%
of the portion between $18,q00and $28,000; and 38% of
the portion over $28,000. In contrast, Act 257 establishes a
maximum regulated rent of 15% of gross margin.
i The relevant portions of Act 257 were later codified as
Hawaii Revised Statute § 486H-10.4.
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The maximum rents Chevron projects it could receive
under the statutory scheme imposed by Act 257 totals
$6,126,646 for 1998. Chevron's projected expenses total
$6,292,855, exceeding Chevron's projected rental income
by $166,209. Chevron concedes, however, that it has not
fully recovered its expenses relating to dealer stations
(including ground lease rents, real property taxes, ordi-
nary maintenance and depreciation) from rent in any
state in the last 20 years.
Instead, Chevron relies on supply contracts to earn a
profit. Dealers who choose to rent a station from Chevron
must, as a condition of their lease, agree to purchase from
Chevron all of the fuel necessary to satisfy demand at
that station for Chevron gasoline. The price under the
supply contract is unilaterally set by Chevron. Both the
lease agreement and the supply contract permit the
dealer to transfer his or her occupancy rights upon
obtaining Chevron's written consent and paying a trans-
fer fee set by Chevron. Act 257 does not prohibit such
transfers.
In conjunction with the alienability of the leaseholds,
the parties stipulated to the following facts:
34. The existing dealer at the time of the enact-
ment of Act 257 may be able to sell his leasehold
at a premium that derives from the value of the
dealer's leasehold interest, given the reduced
rent imposed by Act 257, assuming Chevron
does not object in good faith when the selling
dealer seeks Chevron's consent to the assign-
ment.
35. Assuming everything else remains equal,
the market value of the lessee-dealer leasehold
App. 5
reasonably could be expected to increase as the
amount of the rent payable decreases.
Based largely on these facts, Chevron moved for
summary judgment on its takings claim. 2 Chevron argued
that Act 257 effects a regulatory taking because it fails to
substantially advance a legitimate state interest. Chevron
also maintained that Act 257 prevents the company from
receiving a just and reasonable return. Finally, Chevron
contended that Act 257 is unconstitutional because it
neither provides individualized consideration, nor con-
tains a mechanism for obtaining relief from confiscatory
rent cap provisions. Because the district court resolved
the first argument in Chevron's favor, it declined to reach
the other two.
On appeal, the State challenges both the standard
used by the district court to evaluate Chevron's regula-
tory taking claim and the court's application of that stan-
dard in the summary judgment context.
II
"States have broad power to regulate . . . the land-
lord-tenant relationship.., without paying compensation
for all economic injuries that such regulation entails."
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 440 (1982). When a landowner decides to rent his
land to tenants, the government may place ceilings on the
rents the landowner can charge. See, e.g., PennelI v. San
2 ChevTon's other three claims (42 U.S.C. § 1983, due
process and equal protection) were dismissed without prejudice
by stipulation of the parties and are not at issue in this appeal.
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lose, 485 U,S. 1, 11-12 (1988). "[Wlhile property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
The question in this case is whether Act 257 goes too
far. To analyze that question, the district court concluded
that "the appropriate inquiry is whether [Act 257] sub-
stantially advances a legitimate state interest." In reach-
ing this conclusion, the court explicitly rejected the more
deferential standard urged by the State. The State argues
that the courts should look only to whether "the Legisla-
ture rationally could have believed the Act would sub-
stantially advance a legitimate government purpose. ''3
To support this position, the State relies on a footnote
in Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Key-
stone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470 (1987):
[O]ur inquiry into legislative purpose is not
intended as a license to judge the effectiveness
of legislation. When considering the Fifth
Amendment issues presented by Hawaii's Land
Reform Act, we noted that the Act, "like any
other, may not be successful in achieving its
intended goals. But 'whether in fact the provi-
sions will accomplish the objectives is not the
3 Both the test used by the district court and that suggested
by the State require a legitimate state interest. In this case, the
district court found that the purpose of Act 257 is to "reduc[e]
gasoline prices for Hawaii's consumers." On appeal, the parties
do not contest this finding. Likewise, the parties do not dispute
the legitimacy of this interest.
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question: the [constitutional requirement] is sat-
isfied if... the... [State] Legislature rationally
could have believed that the [Act] would pro-
mote its objective.' " Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242 (1984).
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 511 n. 3 (alterations in original). The
State's reliance on this quote is unsound for two reasons.
First, as the district court correctly noted, Midkiff dealt
with a physical taking, rather than a regulatory one. In a
physical taking, the government exercises its eminent
domain power to take private property for "public use."
Importantly,; the government intends to take the property
and is willing to pay compensation to the landowner. We
have recognized that a more deferential standard applies
in those circumstances. See Richardson v. City and County
of Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150, 1158 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
119 S.Ct. 168 (1998) ("[W]e see nothing inconsistent in
applying heightened scrutiny when the taking is uncom-
pensated, and a more deferential standard when the tak-
ing is fully compensated."); see also Hall v. City of Santa
Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1280 n. 25 (9th Cir. 1986) ("It
makes considerable sense to give greater deference to the
legislature where it deliberately resorts to its eminent
domain power than where it may have stumbled into
exercising it through actions that incidentally result in a
taking.").
Second, the State's argument is foreclosed by our
decision in Richardson. In Richardson, we established that
land use regulations, including rent control ordinances
like Act 257 that permit the capture of a premium, do not
effect a taking if the regulation "substantially furthers a
legitimate state interest." Richardson, 124 F.3d at 1164; see
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also Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485 ("[L]and use regulation can
effect a taking if it 'does not substantially advance legiti-
mate state interests,.., or denies an owner economically
viable use of his land.' ") (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
III
While we recognize the concurring opinion's dissat-
isfaction with our application of the "substantially
advances" test, we do not believe that our holding today
either expands Richardson or contravenes Supreme Court
precedent.
Relying on Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1
(1988), the concurrence asserts that rent control can ordi-
narily only be challenged as violative of due process,
rather than as a regulatory taking. We read Pennell differ-
ently. In that case, a landlord challenged the constitu-
tionality of a city rent control ordinance on three
grounds: (1) the Takings Clause; (2) Due Process; and (3)
Equal Protection. See id. at 4. The Court summarized the
'takings Clause claim as follows:
§ 5703.28 of the Ordinance establishes the seven
factors that a hearing officer is to take into
account in determining the reasonable rent
increase. The first six of these factors are all
objective, and are related either to the landlord's
costs of providing an adequate rental unit, or to
the condition of the rental market. Application
of these six standards results in a rent that is
"reasonable" by reference to what appellants
contend is the only legitimate purpose of rent
control: the elimination of "excessive" rents
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caused by San Jose's housing shortage. When
the hearing officer then takes into account
"hardship to a tenant" pursuant to
§ 5703.28(c)(7) and reduces the rent below the
objectively "reasonable" amount established by
the first six factors, this additional reduction in
the rent increase constitutes a "taking."
Id. at 9.
The Takings Clause claim in Pennell was not based on
the mere existence of rent control, but was instead depen-
dent on the hardship provision. Indeed, because rent
control is not a per se taking, see FCC v. Florida Power
Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 252 (1987), the landlord had to argue
why this particular rent control ordinance effected a tak-
ing. To do so, he focused on the hardship provision, as
the other factors apparently established a reasonable rent.
The Court neither explicitly nor implicitly approved or
disapproved of the landlord's argument. In fact, the
Court declined to reach the merits of the Takings Clause
claim because the hardship provision had never been
applied. See Pennell, 485 U.S. at 9-10. The Court did
proceed to analyze the landlord's remaining constitu-
tional arguments. It did not, however, intimate in any
way that rent control provisions should only be analyzed
under the Due Process Clause. Rather, the Court deter-
mined that the Takings Clause claim was premature and
then analyzed the Due Process Clause claim under the
Due Process "reasonableness" test.
Moreover, to the extent that "something else" is
required to challenge a rent control ordinance under the
Takings Clause, the existence of the premium in this case
suffices. The stipulated possibility that an incumbent
App. 10
dealer will be able to capture the value of the decreased
rent in the form of a premium separates Act 257 from an
ordinary rent control situation, where such a transfer is
prohibited.
Logically; it makes far more sense for us to analyze
Chevron's regulatory takings claim under the Takings
Clause test than it does to review it under the Due
Process Clause test. Chevron raised a Due Process Clause
claim in its First Amended Complaint, but chose not to
move for summary judgment on that claim. Once the
district court in this case granted Chevron's summary
judgment motion on the Takings Clause claim, Chevron
dismissed its remaining claims without prejudice. Thus,
there is no Due Process claim for us to review, even if we
were so inclined.
The concurring opinion also downplays the signifi-
cance of the Supreme Court's language in Yee v. City of
Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992). Although the Court in Yee
did not conclusively announce the applicable test for a
regulatory takings challenge to a rent control statute, it
did suggest that the possibility of a premium similar to
the one in this case "might have some bearing on whether
the ordinance causes a regulatory taking, as it may shed
some light on whether there is a sufficient nexus between
the effect of the ordinance and the objectives it is sup-
posed to advance." Id. at 530. The Court then cited Nollan
v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), which
employs the "substantially advances" test.
The Yee Court went slightly further than in Pennell
and held that the facial regulatory takings challenge was
ripe. See Yee, 503 U.S. at 534. The Court did not reach the
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merits of the regulatory takings claim, however, because
it concluded that the issue was not fairly presented in the
certiorari petition. See id. at 537. In reaching that conclu-
sion, the Court noted that "were we to address the issue
here, we would apparently be the first court in the Nation
to determine whether an ordinance like this one effects a
regulatory taking." Id. at 538.
Although the Court recognized the novelty of the
regulatory takings claim, it did not take an)' position on
its merits. The ordinance in Yee is very similar to Act 257,
in that the transfer of the mobile homes in Yee and the
service station leaseholds here both create the possibility
of a one-time transfer of wealth in the form of a premium
that inures to incumbent lessees. Had the Court in Pennell
rejected a regulatory takings challenge such as the one
posed by Chevron in the instant case, as the concurring
opinion suggests, the Court in Yee would not have needed
to expressly decline to reach the issue. We believe that the
Court's treatment of the regulatory takings issue in Yee
further undermines the concurrence's reading of Pennell.
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,
526 U.S. 687 (1999), gives additional support to the appli-
cation of the "substantially advances" test to Chevron's
Takings Clause claim. Although the Court recognized
that it has not provided a "thorough explanation of the
nature or applicability of the requirement that a regula-
tion substantially advance legitimate public interests out-
side the context of required dedications or exactions," it
noted that the jury instructions given by the trial court
regarding the "substantially advances" test were consis-
tent with the Court's previous general discussions of
regulatory takings liability. Id. at 704. As support for this
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statement, the Court cited several land use regulatory
takings cases, including Yee. See id. It is apparent to us
that the Court viewed the rent control ordinance in Yee in
the same manner as the land use regulations in the other
cases. It is further apparent to us that when challenged as
a regulatory taking, each is subject to the same "substan-
tially advances" test.
We have great difficulty finding Supreme Court pre-
cedent to support the concurring opinion's assertion that
rent control should be viewed differently than other land
use regulations. Accord Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior
Court, 968 P.2d 993, 1021 (Cal. 1999) (Baxter, J., dissenting)
("[W]e cannot assume that decisions upholding other
forms of price control are authority for rejecting a takings
clause challenge to a rent control ordinance.").
The concurring opinion also does not satisfactorily
explain how to deal with Richardson. Richardson is the law
of our circuit and has conclusively answered the question
of what test should be applied in this case. Nevertheless,
the concurring opinion attempts to avoid the holding of
Richardson by inventing a "certainty" requirement that
does not exist. The concurrence would limit the "substan-
tially advances" test to cases in which "the existence of
the premium capture is essentially beyond dispute." We
do not believe that Richardson may faithfully be read so
narrowly. 4
4 We also do not believe that our decision today expands
the holding of Richardson. We save for another day the question
of whether the "substantially advances" test applies outside the
context of rent control statutes that permit the capture of a
premium.
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Finally, we note that other federal cases have applied
the "substantially advances" test in considering a regula-
tory takings challenge to a rent control ordinance. See
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. New York State Div. of
Hous. and Community Renewal, 83 F.3d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1996)
(concluding that rent stabilization law does not constitute
either physical or regulatory taking); Greystone Hotel Co.
v. City of New York, 13 F.Supp.2d 524, 527-29 (S.D.N.Y.)
(concluding that rent stabilization provision substantially
advanced a legitimate state interest and thus did not
effect a regulatory taking); Adamson Cos. v. City of Malibu,
854 F.Supp. 1476, 1501-02 (C.D.Cal.1994) (concluding that
city's mobile home rent control ordinance was substan-
tially related to a legitimate interest).
In sum, we disagree with the concurrenee's position
that we should apply the "reasonableness" test to evalu-
ate Chevron's regulatory takings claim. The correct test is
"whether the legislation substantially advances a legiti-
mate state interest," as discussed above, as suggested by
the Supreme Court in Yee, as used by the district court in
this case, and as established by this court in Richardson.
IV
Although the district court applied the correct stan-
dard, it should not have granted summary judgment.
Notwithstanding the fact that both sides moved for sum-
mary judgment and agreed that summary judgment was
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appropriate one way or the other, genuine issues of mate-
rial fact remain, s
We review a district court's grant of summary judg-
ment de novo. See Balint v. Carson City, 180 F.3d 1047,
1050 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). We determine, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, whether the district court correctly applied the
relevant substantive law and whether there are any genu-
ine issues of material fact. See id. Because Chevron chal-
lenges Act 257 on its face, rather than as applied,
Chevron bears the burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that the regulation does not substantially
advance a legitimate state interest. See City of Monterey v.
Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 700-01
(1999).
s At least one court has held that, under similar
circumstances involving cross-motions for summary judgment,
a party that failed to raise the existence of genuine issues of
material fact before the district court waived the right to do so
on appeal. See Shrink Mzssouri Gov't PACv. Maupin, 71 F.3d 1422,
1423 (8th Cir. 1995). Even then, however, the court proceeded to
analyze whether genuine issues ot material fact remained. The
better-reasoned approach holds that the district court is
responsible for determining whether the requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 are met, whether or not the
parties believe that they are. See, e.g., William W Schwarzer et
al., The Analysis and Decision of SurnmaryJudgment Motions, 139
F.RD. 441,499 (Feb.1992) ("The filing of cross-motions does not
ensure that summary judgment is in order.").
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A
The State argues here that Chevron was not entitled
to summary judgment because the district court ignored
genuine issues of fact raised by the affidavit of its expert
economist, Dr. Keith Leffler. Chevron, in its moving
papers, relied solely on the stipulated fact that an existing
dealer may be able to sell his leasehold at a premium that
derives from the increased value of the dealer's leasehold
interest due to the reduced rent imposed by Act 257.
Based on this possible premium transfer, Chevron argued
that the benefits of Act 257 will inure to the incumbent
dealer, rather than to consumers. Thus, according to
Chevron, Act 257 does not substantially advance its pur-
pose of lowering gasoline prices.
The State relied on Dr. Leffler to rebut Chevron's
argument. In his affidavit, Dr. Leffler asserted that Act
257 is likely to lessen the adverse competitive effects that
result from the highly concentrated gasoline market in
Hawaii and thereby benefit consumers. This is so, accord-
ing to Dr. Leffler, because lower monthly rent payments
reduce a dealer's cost of continued operation, meaning
more dealers are likely to stay in business. The presence
of more dealers means a greater supply of fuel to con-
sumers and a greater supply leads to lower prices. There-
fore, Dr. Leffler predicted that the rent cap would act to
lower retail gasoline prices. Although Dr. Leffler
acknowledged that an oil company could raise the whole-
sale cost of gasoline to dealers in order to make up for
lost rent, he believed that wholesale oil suppliers would
be unlikely to do so because such action would lead
directly to reductions in volume as dealers would react
by raising their street price. He also believed that while a
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premium transfer was possible, an incumbent dealer
could not be expected to capture the net present value of
the reduced rent because the net present value would
depend on too many unknown variables, such as the oil
company's rent policy, the future level of gasoline mar-
gins, and the sales of goods other than gasoline. Even if
new lessee dealers could estimate the present value of
rent reductions accurately, Dr. Leffler stated that any cost
reductions would be fully captured by incumbent dealers
only if the market for the sale of lessee dealer rights was
perfectly competitive. Relying on the stipulated facts,
which indicate that less than three sales of dealer rights
occur per year, Dr. Leffler concluded that the market is
relatively thin, rather than perfectly competitive. Finally,
because Act 257 encourages dealers to stay in business
longer by lowering fixed costs, Dr. Leffler asserted that
Act 257 will benefit consumers even if the premium is
fully captured.
In response to Dr. Leffler, Chevron proffered an affi-
davit from its own expert economist Dr. John Umbeck.
Dr. Umbeck's opinion differs significantly from that of
Dr. Leffler. Dr. Umbeck believes that Act 257 will reduce
the net present value of an oil company's rental revenue
and thereby discourage oil companies from building new
stations or maintaining old ones. Accordingly, Dr.
Umbeck asserted that Act 257 will actually increase the
concentration of Hawaii's gasoline market, rather than
decrease it. Because Dr. Umbeck believes that there will
be fewer stations in the long run, he states that the
demand facing surviving dealers will increase, thus
motivating and allowing them to raise fuel prices. Finally,
Dr. Umbeck disputes Dr. Leffler's conclusion that the
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market for the sale of lessee dealer rights is thin. Dr.
Umbeck believes that the premium value of the capped
rent will be fully captured by the incumbent dealer.
The conflicting affidavits establish that genuine
issues of fact remain as to whether Act 257 will result in
lower gasoline prices. Whether, and to what extent, Chev-
ron will raise its wholesale price of fuel to compensate for
lost rent, and whether, and to what extent, incumbent
dealers will capture the value of the capped rent in the
form of a premium upon transfer of the leasehold, remain
as unanswered questions. Moreover, to the extent that the
district court purported to answer these questions, such
resolution was premature. 6
That the district court engaged in improper fact-finding is
apparent from its summary judgment order. For instance, the
court found, despite evidence to the contrary, that "[b]ecause oil
companies can simply raise their wholesale prices to the same
extent that rent decreases, the dealer is likely to be unaffected
by the rent cap, and gas prices will remain unchanged."
Because this case will be tried to the court, rather than a
jury, the question arises whether it was improper for the district
court to engage in fact-finding, since it will eventually be called
upon to perform that very task. This court has held that if the
parties agree that all of the underlying material facts are
reflected in the written record, a judge may decide factual issues
and essentially convert cross-motions for summary judgment
into submission of the case for trial on the written record. See
Starsky v. Williams, 512 F.2d 109, 111 (9th Cir. 1975). The court
noted, however, that that result was justified Dy the unique
circumstances of that case. See id. Moreover, the court later
cautioned that such fact-finding is not appropriate on an
undeveloped factual record. See TransWorld Airlines, Inc. v.
American Coupon Exchange, Inc., 913 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1990}.
There, the court stated:
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Admittedly, these are questions of predictive fact,
rather than historical fact. Nevertheless, summary judg-
ment is no more appropriate when predictive facts are
disputed. See Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of
Health and Human Servs., 865 F. 2d 320, 326 (D.C.Cir. 1989)
(reversing summary judgment based on conflicting
experts' predictions). In Washington Post, the plaintiff
sought access under the Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552, to certain financial disclosure forms filed by
National Cancer Institute consultants. See id. at 321. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
[W]here the ultimate fact in dispute is destined for
decision by the court rather than by a jury, there is no
reason why the court and the parties should go
through the motions of a trial if the court will
eventually end up deciding on the same record.
However, just as the procedural shortcut must not be
disfavored, courts must not rush to dispose
summarily of cases - especially novel, complex, or
otherwise difficult cases of public importance -
unless it is clear that more complete factual
development could not possibly alter the outcome
and that the credibility of the witnesses' statements or
testimony is not at issue. Even when the expense of
further proceedings is great and the moving party's
case seems to the court quite likely to succeed,
speculation about the/acts must not take the place of
investigation, proof, and direct observation.
ld. at 684-85. Although the parties in this case submitted a
Stipulation of Facts, there is no clear indication, as there ,,.,'as in
Starsky, that all of the relevant facts are contained in the written
record. In fact, in the Stipulation itself, the parties clearly
reserve the right to rely on other statements. Therefore, we hold
that the district court erred in resolving factual disputes at this
stage, even though it must do so later.
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government. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that a gen-
uine issue of material fact existed as to the effect of
disclosure on the government's ability to obtain the infor-
mation it needed from its scientist-consultants. See id. In
so holding, the court reviewed the evidence in the record
and concluded that the conflicting affidavits created a
genuine issue of fact regarding the consequences of dis-
closing the sought-after information. The court explicitly
rejected the trial court's explanation that
[r]esolution of this dispute involves an analysis
of the potential, hypothetical impairment the
government might suffer .... Due to the nature
of the inquiry, there is no definitive proof that
may be adduced by either side in support of
their respective contentions. At best, the parties
may provide the Court with speculation from
individuals who speak with varying degrees of
authority.
ld. at 324. The court held that the district court had
"short-circuited the fact-finding process." Id. at 326. The
court further explained that:
"Factual" issues like those presented here are
rarely susceptible to definitive proof. Rather,
"factual" issues that involve predictive facts
almost always require a court to survey the
available evidence, to credit certain pieces of
evidence above others, and to draw cumulative
inferences until it reaches a judgmental conclu-
sion. In the end, the court makes its best assess-
ment about what is most likely to happen in the
future. In such an inquiry, the ultimate "facts" in
dispute are most successfully approached when
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all relevant evidentiary underpinnings are fully
developed.
Id. at 326.
As in Washington Post, the experts' conflicting predic-
tions here created genuine issues of fact. A proper eval-
uation of Act 257 depends upon further development of
the experts' underlying facts. Although both experts
based their opinions on the stipulated facts, they also rely
on other unproven factual assumptions. In order to deter-
mine whose predictions are more accurate, there needs to
be a better understanding of the competitiveness of the
market for the sale and purchase of lessee dealer rights
and the elasticity of demand for gasoline. This can be
attained only through additional factual development
and cross-examination of the parties' expert witnesses,
Cross-examination is particularly appropriate here
because it is necessary for the court to evaluate the wit-
nesses' credibility in order to evaluate their expert opin-
ions. By adopting the predictions of Chevron's expert
without the benefit of this needed information, the dis-
trict court "short-circuited the fact-finding process."
B
Issues of fact do not preclude summary judgment
unless they are material to the substantive claim at issue,
that is, unless they "might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law." Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro.
Police Dep't, 159 F.3d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
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The factual disputes here are material only if their resolu-
tion would alter whether Act 257 "substantially advances
a legitimate state interest."
In order to determine materiality, we first determine
what is required by the "substantially advances" test.
Obviously, a connection of some sort must be established
between Act 257's means (that is, a maximum regulated
rent) and the intended end (lower gas prices). The ques-
tion arises whether the mere possibility that the rent cap
will not achieve its purpose is sufficient to destroy this
nexus. The district court, relying on Richardson, believed
this to be the case. If that belief is correct, the factual
disputes are not material because the parties concede that
that possibility exists. If, however, the standard requires a
closer evaluation of the likelihood that the means will
achieve the end, then these disputes are material:
In Richardson, we held that a Honolulu ordinance that
imposed a cap on rent for land under condominium units
was an unconstitutional regulatory taking. The court con-
cluded that:
The absence of a mechanism that prevents les-
sees from capturing the net present value of the
reduced land rent in the form of a premium,
means that the Ordinance will not substantially
further its goal of creating affordable owner-
occupied housing in Honolulu. Incumbent
owner occupants who sell to those who intend
to occupy the apartment will charge a premium
for the benefit of living in a rent controlled
condominium. The price of housing ultimately
will remain the same. The Ordinance thus
effects a regulatory taking.
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124 F.3d at 1166. Importantly, our conclusion in Rich-
ardson was based on the district court's findings that
incumbent owners will charge a premium and that the
price of housing will remain the same. Apparently, these
findings were not contested on appeal.
Whether the price of gasoline will remain the same
here is vigorously contested. The mere possibility that it
will does not satisfy Chevron's burden of proving that
Act 257 does not substantially further its purpose. Log-
ically, there must be a determination of the likelihood of
that possibility. Otherwise, regulatory legislation would
be unconstitutional any time it was not absolutely guar-
anteed to achieve its purpose. Would a statute that was
95% likely to be effective fail to substantially advance its
interest simply because there was a 5% chance that it
would not achieve its goal? What if the statute was 99%
effective? Surely the 1% chance that it would be ineffec-
tive does not, as a matter of law, mean that the statute
does not "substantially advance" its purpose.
Not only does such a reading of Richardson fail the
logic test, but it also fails to consider the language. Had
the test been intended to require an absolute cause-and-
effect relationship, the word "substantially" would have
no meaning. For these reasons, the district court improp-
erly relied on Richardson to conclude that the absence of a
mechanism that prevents a premium transfer necessarily
destroys the constitutionally-required connection.
The State argues that the existence of a premium is
not relevant. As discussed in Section lfI above, however,
the Supreme Court recognized this relevance in Yee, 503
U.S. at 530. While the existence of a premium transfer had
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nothing to do with a physical taking, the Court stated
that "[t]his effect might have some bearing on whether
the ordinance causes a regulatory taking, as it may shed
some light on whether there is a sufficient nexus between
the effect of the ordinance and the objectives it is sup-
posed to advance." Id. The Supreme Court did not hold
that the possibility of a premium transfer necessarily
defeated that connection; it recognized only that it "might
have some bearing" on it. Id.
The questio n remains as to what exactly the connec-
tion does require. In a candid statement, the Supreme
Court recently acknowledged that it has not provided a
"thorough explanation of the nature or applicability of
the requirement that a regulation substantially advance
legitimate public interests outside the context of required
dedications or exactions .... " City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at
704. In City of Monterey, the Court affirmed judgment in
favor of Del Monte Dunes, a property owner who con-
tended that the city's repeated rejections of its plans for
development effected an unconstitutional regulatory tak-
ing. The Court held that the case was properly submitted
to a jury. Although the Court refused to consider the City
of Monterey's challenge to the jury instructions, as the
City itself had proposed their essence, the Court nonethe-
less noted that the following jury instructions were con-
sistent with the Court's previous discussions of
regulatory takings liabilitv:
"Public bodies, such as the city, have the author-
ity to take actions which substantially advance
legitimate public interest[s] .... So one of your
jobs as jurors is. to decide if the city's decision
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here substantially advanced any such legitimate
public purpose.
"The regulatory actions of the city or any
agency substantially advanc[e] a legitimate pub-
lic purpose of the action bears a reasonable rela-
tionship to that objective.
"Now, if the preponderance of the evidence
establishes that there was no reasonable rela-
tionship between the city's denial of
the . . . proposal and legitimate public purpose,
you should find in favor of the plaintiff. If you
find that there existed a reasonable relationship
between the city's decision and a legitimate
public purpose, you should find in favor of the
city. As long as the regulatory action by the city
substantially advances their [sic] legitimate pub-
lic purpose .... its underlying motives and
reasons are not to be inquired into."
526 U.S. at 700-01. Based on these instructions, a chal-
lenged regulatory action "substantially advances" its
interest if it bears a reasonable relationship to that inter-
est.
Understanding what the "substantially advances"
test requires also depends to some extent on understand-
ing what it does not require. In City of Monterey, the Court
declined to extend the "rough proportionality" test
beyond the special context of exactions - land use deci-
sions conditioning approval of development on the dedi-
cation of property to public use. See id. at 702-03. Thus,
City of Monterey teaches that a reasonable relationship
does not depend on the State's action being roughly
proportional to its asserted interests.
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Whether Act 257's rent cap is reasonably related to its
objective of lowering fuel prices certainly depends on
whether it will in fact lead to lower fuel prices. The
factual issues that remain in dispute are material to the
ultimate determination required in this action. We hold
that the district court should not have granted summary
judgment on Chevron's first argument.
C
Because the judgment can be affirmed on any basis
supported in the record, we briefly consider the second
and third arguments made by Chevron in its summary
judgment motion, even though the district court did not.
There are two ways in which a party can challenge a
regulatory action on its face. The first has been thor-
oughly discussed above. The second depends on whether
the regulation deprives an owner of the economic via-
bility of property. An owner is not denied the economic
viability of property, unless there remains no permissible
or beneficial use for that property after the regulatory
action. See City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 700 (quoting jury
instruction to that effect). Chevron has made no such
showing. In fact, the evidence shows that Act 257 allows
Chevron to charge approximately $1.1 million more than
it would otherwise have charged under its own rental
program. Although this evidence may be useful to Chev-
ron in demonstrating the ineffectiveness of Act 257, it
belies its claim of loss of economic viability.
Chevron also argues that Act 257 is unconstitutional
because it fails to provide for any individualized consid-
eration and contains no mechanism for obtaining relief
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from the confiscatory rent limitation provisions. In sup-
port of this argument, Chevron relies on two state court
cases and one of the two district court orders in Rich-
ardson. See Cromwell Assocs. v. Mayor and Council of New-
ark, 511 A.2d 1273, 1275 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985);
Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001, 1028-1033 (Cal.
1976); Richardson v. City and County of Honohdu, 802 E
Supp. 326, 336-37 (D. Haw. 1992) ("Richardson II'). The
precedents established in these cases do not bind us.
Although addressed by the district court in Richardson II,
in Richardson we declined to reach the issue on appeal.
Likewise, the Supreme Court in Permian Basin Area Rate
Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 770 (1968), refused to decide whether
individualized consideration and administrative relief
were "constitutionally imperative." Earlier Supreme
Court cases, however, have suggested that there are no
such constitutional requirements. In Bowles v. Willingham,
321 U.S. 503, 518 (1944), the Court stated that otherwise
valid price-fixing was not improper because it was on a
class rather than an individual basis. Justice Brandeis
stated for a unanimous Court in Phillips v. Commissioner,
283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931), that "[w]here only property
rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial
enquiry is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity
given for the ultimate judicial determination of the lia-
bility is adequate." As evidenced by the instant action,
Chevron was not denied an opportunity to seek judicial
review of Act 257.
Finally, the cases relied upon by Chevron - Cromwell
Associates, Birkenfeld, and Richardson II - are distinguish-
able because they involved ordinances that regulated a
landlord's sole source of revenue. Imposing a maximum
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rent removed the only mechanism by which a landlord
could increase revenues in the event of an increase in
costs. Chevron's lessee dealer stations provide Chevron
with two sources of revenue. For the past 20 years, Chev-
ron has relied on its lessee dealers' contractually-required
purchase of gasoline to assure a reasonable rate of return
on its service stations. Act 257 does not regulate this
revenue source. Accordingl?,; Act 257's failure to contain
an administrative relief provision does not result in a
facial taking.
V
Genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether
Act 257 will benefit consumers. Specifically, the record
contains conflicting evidence as to whether incumbent
dealers will capture a premium based on the increased
value of their leaseholds due to the imposition of a maxi-
mum permissible regulated rent, thereby depriving new
dealers and consumers from reaping the benefits of Act
257. Questions also remain as to whether oil companies
will raise the wholesale price of fuel and thereby uni-
laterally offset the benefits of the Act. Because resolution
of these factual issues is necessary to determine whether
Act 257 substantially advances, or bears a reasonable
relationship to, the State's interest in lowering gasoline
prices, the district court erred in granting summary judg-
ment. Summary judgment is likewise inappropriate on
the other two grounds urged by Chevron.
We VACATE the judgment of the district court and
REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
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W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judg-
ment:
I disagree with the majority's analysis. Plaintiff
Chevron challenges Hawaii Act 257, a rent control law
limiting the amount an oil company can charge a dealer
who leases a service station from the company. In a
motion for summary judgment, Chevron argued that Act
257 is unconstitutional. The district court found Act 257
unconstitutional, granted Chevron's motion, and entered
final judgment for Chevron. Defendant Cayetano timely
appealed. We reverse and remand.
For the reasons that follow, ! concur in the reversal of
the grant of summary judgment to Chevron. I disagree,
however, with the majority's rationale and with the task
the majority has set for the district court on remand.
I
There are two distinct tests of constitutionality poten-
tially applicable to Act 257. The first is a "reasonable-
ness" test normally applied to rent control laws. The
second is a "substantially advances a legitimate state
interest" test normally applied to zoning and land use
regulations. Relying on our earlier decision in Richardson
v. City and County of Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir.
1997), the majority analyzes Act 257 under the second
test. The problem in this case is not determining whether
the majority has properly applied that test. The problem,
rather, is determining whether the test should be applied
at all.
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An ordinary rent control law is constitutionally indis-
tinguishable from a price control law. Rent control
involves a price charged for real property, just as price
control involves a price charged for personal property.
The constitutional test for ordinary rent and price control
laws is the same, regardless of whether the laws are
challenged under the Due Process Clause or the Takings
Clause. The test has been variously formulated, but it
essentially requires that the law be "reasonable" and "not
confiscatory." A few examples illustrate the point.
In Pennell v. City of San Jose, 488 U.S. 1, 11 (1988), the
Supreme Court cited a rate regulation case in upholding a
municipal rent control ordinance challenged under the
Due Process Clause. The Court upheld the ordinance
because it was not "'arbitrary, discriminator); or demon-
strably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to
adopt .... ' Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747,
769-770 (1968)." In FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S.
245, 253 (1987), the Court upheld a rate regulation chal-
lenged under the Takings Clause as "not confiscatory."
Citing the same rate regulation case as PennelI, it wrote
that a regulation is permitted under the Constitution to
"'limit stringently the return recovered on investment,
for investors' interests provide only one of the variables
in the constitutional calculus of reasonableness.'" Id. (cit-
ing Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. at 769). In In re
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, the 1968 case cited in both
Pennell and FCC v. Florida Power, the Court upheld a rate
set by the Federal Power Commission without specifying
whether the challenge was brought under the Due Pro-
cess or Takings Clause: "any rate selected by the Commis-
sion from the broad zone of reasonableness . . . cannot
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properly be attacked as confiscatory." 390 U.S. at 770. In
Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 517 (1944), the Court
upheld a federal rent control law after applying the same
test as for a price control law: "Of course, price control,
the same as other forms of regulation, may reduce the
value of the property regulated. But . . . that does not
mean that the regulation is unconstitutional." Finally, in
Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315
U.S. 575, 585 (1942), the Court upheld a rate regulation
challenged under the Due Process Clause because it was
"reasonable" and "not confiscatory."
Beginning with Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255
(1980), the Supreme Court developed a more stringent
test of constitutionality for zoning and land use regula-
tion cases. The zoning ordinance in Agins severely limited
development of privately owned land in order to pre-
serve open space for the community. The Court upheld
the constitutionality of the ordinance against a regulatory
taking challenge because the ordinance "substantially
advance[d] legitimate state goals." Id. at 261. In Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), the
California Coastal Commission required owners of a
beachfront house to grant a public easement across their
property as a condition for receiving a permit to rebuild
the house. Citing Agins, the Court stated, "[O]ur verbal
formulations in the takings field have generally been
quite different [from those applicable to due process]. We
have required that the regulation 'substantially advance'
the 'legitimate state interest' sought be achieved, not that
the State could rationally have decided that the measure
adopted might achieve the State's objectives." Id. at 834
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n.3 (emphasis in original; citations and internal quota-
tions omitted). The Court further required that the ease-
ment have a connection, or "essential nexus," to the harm
that would be caused by rebuilding the house. Absent
such a nexus, the required conveyance of an easement to
the public would be nothing more than "extortion." Id. at
837. Finally, in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994),
the city of Tigard, Oregon, required the owner of a com-
mercial building to dedicate a portion of her property for
parking and floodplain protection as a condition of
receiving a permit to expand the building. The Court
repeated the test from Agins and refined the Nollan
"essential nexus" test. "A land use regulation does not
effect a taking if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate
state interests' and does not 'den[y] an owner economi-
cally viable use of his land.'" Id. at 385. Further, a
"required dedication" from the landowner is constitu-
tionally permissible if it bears a "rough proportionality"
to the "nature and extent of the impact of the proposed
development" for which the permit is sought. Id. at 391,
The Supreme Court has applied the "substantially
advances a legitimate state interest" test of Agins, and its
refinement in Nollan and Dolan, only in cases of severe
zoning limitations on the use of land (Agins) and required
dedications by landowners as a condition of receiving
building permits (Nollan and Dolan). See, e.g., City of
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 119 S.Ct.
1624, 1635-36 (1999) ('[WJe have not extended the rough
proportionality test of Dolan beyond the special context of
exactions - land-use decisions conditioning approval of
development on the dedication of property to public
use .... IT]his Court has [not] provided . . . a thorough
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explanation of the nature or applicability of the require-
ment that a regulation substantially advance legitimate
public interests outside the context of required dedica-
tions or exactions."). In two cases, however, the Supreme
Court has hinted that, in special circumstances, a rent
control law might amount to a regulatory taking and
might therefore be subject to the "substantially advances
a legitimate state interest" test.
In 1988, the Court considered a San Jose, California,
rent control ordinance in Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485
U.S. 1 (1988). The Court made clear that the ordinance,
considered as a whole, should be analyzed under the
normal reasonableness test:
The standard for determining whether a state
price-control regulation is constitutional under
the Due Process Clause is well-established:
"Price control is 'unconstitutional... if arbitrar);
discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the
policy the legislature is free to adopt .... '"
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747,
769-770 (1968).
485 U.S. at 11 (citation omitted). Applying this test, the
Court sustained the rent control ordinance, holding that it
represented "a rational attempt to accommodate the con-
flicting interests of protecting tenants from burdensome
rent increases while at the same time ensuring that the
landlords are guaranteed a fair return on their invest-
ment." Id. at 13.
The plaintiffs also brought a Takings Clause chal-
lenge to a specific provision in the ordinance that
appeared to require a direct wealth transfer to a particu-
lar tenant based on the poverty of that tenant. Under the
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ordinance, a landlord seeking a rent increase of more
than 8% was required to go before a hearing officer who
was authorized to consider, among other factors, individ-
ual hardship. If the proposed increase above 8% constitu-
ted "'an unreasonably severe financial or economic
hardship on a particular tenant,'" the increase could be
denied. Id. at 6. The landlords contended that denial of a
proposed increase on that ground would constitute a
taking, but the Court refused to decide the challenge, or
even to specify a test for deciding it, because the provi-
sion had never been applied and a decision would there-
fore be "premature." Id. at 9.
Next, in Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992),
the Court addressed a takings challenge to an Escondido,
California, mobile home rent control ordinance brought
by owners of a mobile home park. As background to their
challenge, the park owners pointed out that, despite their
name, mobile homes are not mobile; once placed in a
park, only about one mobile home in 100 is ever moved.
See id. at 523. The park owners also pointed to Califor-
nia's Mobilehome Residency Law, which severely limited
their ability to terminate mobile home owners' tenancies
or prevent transfer of tenancies to purchasers of the
mobile homes. The park owners contended that the rent
control ordinance, when viewed against this background,
amounted to a physical taking of their property. See id. at
525. The Court rejected this contention.
The park owners further contended that the ordi-
nance constituted a regulatory taking, but the Court
refused to consider the issue because it was not included
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in the grant of certiorari. However, in rejecting the plain-
tiffs' claim of physical taking, the Court wrote the follow-
ing:
[TJhe effect of the rent control ordinance, cou-
pled with the restrictions on the park owner's
freedom to reject new tenants, is to increase
significantly the value of the mobile home. This
increased value normally benefits only the ten-
ant in possession at the time the rent control is
imposed .... Petitioners are correct in citing the
existence of this premium as a difference
between the alleged effect of the Escondido
ordinance and that of an ordinary apartment
rent control statute. Most apartment tenants do
not sell anything to their successors (and are
often prohibited from charging "key money"),
so a typical rent control statute will transfer
wealth from the landlord to the incumbent ten-
ant and future tenants. By contrast, petitioners
contend that the Escondido ordinance transfers
wealth only to the incumbent mobile home
owner. This effect might have some bearing on
whether the ordinance causes a regulatory tak-
ing, as it may shed some light on whether there
is a sufficient nexus between the effect of the
ordinance and the objectives it is supposed to
advance. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comrn'n.
But it has nothing to do with whether the ordi-
nance causes a physical taking.
Id. at 530 (citation omitted).
A panel of this court in Richardson relied on this
passage from Yee in evaluating a Honolulu rent control
ordinance. The ordinance limited long-term ground rents
for residential condominiums and allowed condominium-
owners/ground-lessees to sell their condominiums, and
App. 35
their leaseholds, without restriction. It was clear that by
selling their condominiums and leaseholds, the condo-
minium owners could, like the mobile home owners in
Yee, capture a premium representing the present value of
the difference between the controlled rent for the ground
lease and the open market rent that would be charged in
the absence of the ordinance. Because of this one-time
wealth transfer to the current condominium owners, Rich-
ardson treated the ordinance as a regulatory taking and
applied the "substantially advances a legitimate state
interest" test from Agins, Nollan and Dolan: "A land use
regulation . . . does not effect a taking if it substantially
furthers a legitimate state interest and does not deny the
landowner economically viable use of his land. Dolan, 512
U.S. at 385" 124 F.3d at 1164. Richardson then struck down
the ordinance because the ability of the owner to capture
the premium by selling the condominium at an open
market price meant that the ordinance did not "substan-
tially further its goal of creating affordable owner-occu-
pied housing in Honolulu." ld. at 1166.
The panel today greatly expands the holding in Rich-
ardson. Following the Supreme Court's suggestion in Yee,
Richardson held that the "substantially advances a legiti-
mate state interest" test was applicable in a case where it
was clear that there was a premium resulting in a one-
time wealth transfer from the landlord to the tenant.
Absent such a transfer, the ordinance in Richardson would
have been subject to the reasonableness test normally
applied to rent control ordinances. In deciding whether to
apply the "substantially advances a legitimate state inter-
est test," the majority in this case does not first ask how
clear it is that such a premium will be captured by the
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lessee. Rather, it treats Richardson as creating a presump-
tive rule that rent control laws are to be evaluated under
the "substantially advances a legitimate state interest"
test rather than the reasonableness test: "We established
in Richardson that land use regulations, including rent
control ordinances like Act 257, do not effect a taking if
the regulation 'substantially furthers a legitimate state
interest.' Richardson, 124 F.3d at 1164." Maj. Op. at 11723.
When the majority says that "rent ordinances like Act
257" are subject to the "substantially advances a legiti-
mate state interest" test, it appears to mean that the mere
possibility of a premium capture by an incumbent tenant
is enough to render a rent control ordinance "like Act
257." It writes, "The stipulated possibility that an incum-
bent dealer will be able to capture the value of the
decreased rent in the form of a premium separates Act
257 from an ordinary rent control situation[.]" Maj. Op. at
11725 (emphasis added). But the possibility of premium
capture exists under virtually all rent control ordinances.
Even under ordinances under which subleasing and
assigning are prohibited, subleasing and assigning (and
resulting premium capture) are nonetheless often com-
monplace.
We do not know in this case whether the tenants will,
in fact, capture a premium. But even without knowing
this, the majority has determined that the "substantially
advances a legitimate state interest" test should be used
to test the constitutionality of Act 257. The majority might
respond that it does not matter that, at the time of deter-
mining what test to apply, the Court does not know
whether a premium will be captured. That is, if upon
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investigation it turns out that there is no captured pre-
mium, the ordinance will pass the test. In other words, no
harm, no foul. The problem with this response is that the
constitutional test applied by the majority is not phrased
in terms of whether a premium is captured. Rather, the
test asks whether the rent control ordinance "substan-
tially advances a legitimate state interest." Premium cap-
ture by the tenant is only one of many ways in which an
ordinance can fail that test. Thus, if it turns out that there
is, in fact, no premium capture, an ordinance may none-
theless be struck down because it fails for some other
reason substantially to advance a legitimate state interest.
Even if our decision in Richardson was right, I believe
that the majority is wrong to expand it beyond the cate-
gory of cases in which the existence of the premium
capture is essentially beyond dispute. I believe that in
expanding the holding of Richardson, the majority's opin-
ion undermines or even contradicts the Supreme Court's
decisions in ordinary rent control cases such as Pennell
and Bowles v. Willingham, as well as threatens its decisions
in price control cases such as FCC v. Florida Power and the
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases.
II
If the majority confined itself to Richardson, it would
not be able to apply the "substantially advances a legiti-
mate state interest" test to the facts of this case. Under the
suggested analysis in Yee, and as I read Richardson, the
prerequisite to the application of that test is that there be
a clear capture of the premium resulting from the rent
control ordinance. Because there is no clear showing in
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this case that the premium will be captured by the les-
sees, the prerequisite for applying the test does not exist.
The factual foundation in this case is provided by a
lengthy Stipulation of Facts filed in the district court.
Stipulations 26 and 27 state that Chevron dealers can sell
their dealerships (and associated leaseholds), and that the
selling price is not limited either by Chevron's dealer
lease or supply contracts or by Act 257. However, such a
sale is subject to two conditions. First, Stipulation 30
states that Chevron could object to the sale in "good
faith," as that term is defined by Hawaii Revised Statute
§ 486H-1: "The petroleum distributor shall not impose on
a gasoline dealer by contract, rule, or regulation, whether
written or oral, any standard of conduct that is not rea-
sonable and of material significance to the franchise rela-
tionship." It is not clear from the materials available to us
whether Chevron would be acting in good faith within
this definition if it allowed a dealer to sell a dealership
and leasehold only on condition that the premium result-
ing from Act 257 be passed on to the new dealer in
calculating the sale price. Stipulation 34 suggests that
such a condition might be in good faith: "The existing
dealer at the time of the enactment of Act 257 may be able
to sell his leasehold at a premium that derives from the
value of the dealer's leasehold interest, given the reduced
rent imposed by Act, assuming that Chevron does not
object in good faith when the selling dealer seeks Chev-
ron's consent to the assignment." Second, Stipulation 26
states that Chevron may require the payment of an
unspecified "transfer fee" as a condition of permitting the
sale of a dealership. It is not clear from the materials
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before us whether such a transfer fee could include the
premium resulting from Act 257.
Further, Act 257 only limits the amount of rent Chev-
ron can charge its lessee-dealers. Chevron derives its
revenue from them not only through rent, but also
through the wholesale price for gasoline. Stipulation 15
states that Chevron requires its dealers, as a condition of
their lease, to purchase Chevron-branded gasoline
directly from Chevron. Stipulation 17 states, "Chevron
recovers its expenses and investment costs of lessee
dealer stations (e.g., ground-lease rent, real property
taxes, ordinary maintenance, and depreciation) in Hawaii
and throughout the United States through two principal
revenue streams - rental revenue and earnings on Chev-
ron gasoline sold through the stations." Stipulation 9
states, "Under a supply contract, the lessee-dealer mar-
kets Chevron motor fuels, which the lessee dealer buys
from Chevron, at a price unilaterally determined by Chevron.
Chevron does not enter into a dealer lease unless the
dealer simultaneously executes a supply contract with
Chevron" (emphasis added).
It is thus entirely within Chevron's power to prevent
its lessee-dealers from capturing any premium resulting
from Act 257. Chevron may have that power pursuant to
its ability to object in good faith to a sale or to impose a
transfer fee. Chevron certainly has that power pursuant
to its ability unilaterally to increase the wholesale price of
the gasoline to its dealers. Indeed, the district court speci-
fically discussed Chevron's ability to charge more for its
gasoline and thereby to capture the premium: "Defen-
dant's expert fails to explain why the oil company would
not increase the wholesale price to simply offset the
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decrease in rent .... Neither Defendants nor Defendants'
expert have offered any reason why this is not a feasible,
and even likely, result."
I recognize that the district court also stated that "the
Act... allows incumbent dealers to capture the value of
the decreased rent in the form of a premium," but the
court made the statement to show why the Act was not
likely to achieve its purpose of lowering retail gasoline
prices rather than to justify the application of the "sub-
stantially advances a legitimate state interest" test. The
question under Richardson is not whether the terms of the
Act themselves allow - i.e., do not prohibit - capture of
the premium; rather, the question is whether the Act
creates a situation where we know the premium will, in
fact, be captured. As the district court noted, the "feas-
ible, even likely; result" is that Chevron will take that
premium for itself in the form of higher wholesale prices
charged to its dealers.
III
I fear that under the maiority opinion virtually all
rent control laws in the Ninth Circuit are now subject to
the "substantially advances a legitimate state interest"
test, and that this test may invalidate many of these laws.
I will not undertake an extended analysis of the economic
and social effects of rent control laws. Suffice it to say
that the virtually unanimous opinion of economists is
that, except in unusual and short-lived circumstances,
they often do not achieve their stated purposes. They
result in the creation of large and unwieldy bureau-
cracies. They do not subsidize the truly needy - the
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homeless and those in public housing; rather, they subsi-
dize those already able to pay for their own housing,
including many who can easily pay an open market price.
They interfere with the normal play of free market forces,
thereby creating incentives that result in reduced supplies
of housing, reduced maintenance and repairs on existing
housing, increased housing code violations, and
increased transportation inefficiencies when tenants
change schools or jobs but remain in rent-controlled
housing.
The question before the judiciary is not the
advisability of rent control laws but rather their constitu-
tionality. Ever since its retreat from economic substantive
due process at the end of the 1930s, the Supreme Court
has essentially left it to the other branches of government
to decide, in their political wisdom, whether to adopt rent
and price controls. The Supreme Court's hints in Pennell
and Yee may signal a willingness to rethink this long-ago
retreat, but at this point the Court has not yet done so.
I am not sure whether, in Richardson, we properly
interpreted the Court's hints in Yee in concluding that the
"substantially advances a legitimate state interest" test
used in zoning and land use regulation cases should have
been applied to the rent control ordinance in that case. I
am inclined to think that we did not. I am sure, however,
that the majority in this case extends Richardson beyond
current law.
IV
It is not clear that Hawaii's Act 257 will result in the
capture of a premium representing a one-time wealth
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transfer to dealers currently leasing stations from Chev-
ron. Thus, even assuming that Richardson is good law, Act
257 should not be analyzed under the "substantially
advances a legitimate state interest" test. Rather, Act 257
should be analyzed under the reasonableness test appli-
cable to ordinary rent and price control laws. While I
agree with the majority that the summary judgment
granted to Chevron should be reversed, I disagree with
the majority about the district court's task on remand. In
my view, the district court should apply the reasonable-
ness test applied - until today - to ordinary rent and
price control laws.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
CHEVRON U.S.A. INC., CIV. NO.
Plaintiff, 97-0933 ACK
VS.
BENJAMIN J.
CAYETANO, ET AL.,
• Defendants.
ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
SYNOPSIS
(Filed Nov. 10, 1998)
The Court is mindful of the strongly felt concerns of
the legislature that Hawaii's consumers are paying too
much for gasoline. However, the Court finds that Act 257
as crafted fails to substantially further this legitimate
state interest, and therefore effects an unconstitutional
taking. _ Section 3(c) of Act 257, which limits rents that an
oil company may charge its lessee dealers, fails to benefit
dealers and consumers for two principal reasons. First,
similar to the condominium tenants under the rent con-
trol ordinance declared unconstitutional in Richardson v.
City and County of Honolulu, incumbent dealers are able to
i The Court notes the State of Hawaii has now pursued
other means to rectify these concerns by filing suit against
gasoline wholesalers in Hawaii, alleging, inter alia, they have
engaged in price fixing.
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capture the value of reduced rent in the form of a pre-
mium upon sale of their leaseholds, and consequently,
incoming lessee dealers are not benefitted by the Act. 124
E3d 1150 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 1998 WL 313049
(Oct. 5, 1998), and cert. denied, 1998 WL 407121 (Oct. 5,
1998). 2 Second, since oil companies can offset rent reduc-
tions by increasing wholesale gasoline prices, they can
unilaterally negate any benefit to be realized by dealers
and consumers.
BACKGROUND
On June 21, 1997, the Hawaii Legislature, prompted
by concerns regarding the relatively high price of gas-
oline charged to Hawaii consumers, enacted Act 257 of
the Hawaii Revised Statutes. Act 257, inter alia, imple-
ments restrictions on gasoline manufacturers and jobbers
in dealing with their retail dealers. Specifically, Section
3(c) of Act 257 ("the Act") restricts the amount of lease
rent an oil company may charge a lessee dealer for use of
a service station.
In response to the enactment of the Act, Plaintiff
Chevron brought suit against Defendants Benjamin J.
Cayetano, Governor of the State of Hawaii, and Margery
S. Bronster, Attorney General of the State of Hawaii,
challenging Section 3 of the Act as effecting an uncon-
stitutional taking of Chevron's property in violation of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
2 The Court notes that Act 257 was enacted before the Ninth
Circuit Court issued its decision in Richardson.
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States Constitution. Section 3 of the Act reads, in perti-
nent part:
(c) All leases as part of a franchise as defined
in section 486H-1, existing on August 1, 1997, or
entered into thereafter, shall be construed in
conformity with the following:
(1) Such renewal [of the lessee-dealer's lease-
hold] shall not be scheduled more frequently
than once every three years; and
(2) Upon renewal [of the leasehold], the lease
rent payable shall not exceed fifteen percent of
the gross sales, except for gasoline, which shall
not exceed fifteen percent of the gross profit of
product, excluding all related taxes by the
dealer operated retail service station as defined
in section 486H-1 and 486H-plus, in the case of a
retail service station at a location where the
manufacturer or jobber is the lessee and not the
owner of the ground lease, a percentage increase
equal to any increase which the manufacturer or
jobber is required to pay the lessor under the
ground lease for the service station. For the
purpose of this subsection, "gross amount"
means all monetary earnings of the dealer from
a dealer operated retail service station after all
applicable taxes, excluding income taxes, are
paid. The provisions of this subsection shall not
apply to any existing contracts that may be in
conflict with its provisions.
(d) Nothing in this section shall prohibit a
dealer from selling a retail service station in any
manner.
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 486H-10.4 (1997).
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On January 28, 1998, Plaintiff filed a motion for par-
tial summary judgment on its Second Claim for Relief. On
July 30, 1998, Defendants responded and filed a cross
motion for summary judgment on all claims in Plaintiff's
complaint. On August 19, 1998, and August 28, 1998,
Plaintiff and Defendants each filed their respective re-
plies. The Court heard oral arguments on September 8,
1998. Both parties agreed that this case should be decided
one way or the other on summary judgment.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment shall be granted where there is
no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Cir. P.
56(c). One of the principal purposes of the summary
judgment procedure is to identify and dispose of factu-
ally unsupported claims and defenses. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrelt, 477 U.S 317, 323 (1986).
The United States Supreme Court has declared that
summary judgment must be granted against a party who
fails to demonstrate facts to establish an element essential
to his case where that party will bear the burden of proof
of that essential element at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at
322. "If the party moving for summary judgment meets
its initial burden of identifying for the court the portions
of the materials on file that it believes demonstrate the
absence of any genuine issue of material fact [citations
omitted], the nonmoving party may not rely on the mere
allegations in the pleadings in order to preclude sum-
mary judgment." T.W. Elec. Serv. v. Paczfic Elec. Contractors
Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).
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Rather, Rule 56(e) requires that the nonmoving party
set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56,
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. See ZW. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. At least some
"significant probative evidence tending to support the
complaint" must be produced. Id. Legal memoranda and
oral argument are not evidence and do not create issues
of fact capable of defeating an otherwise valid motion for
summary judgment. See British Airways Bd. v. Boeing Co.,
585 F.2d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 1978).
The standard for a grant of summary judgment
reflects the standard governing the grant of a directed
verdict. See Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of North America, 815 F.2d
1285, 1289 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)). Thus, the question is
whether "reasonable minds could differ as to the import
of the evidence." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51.
The Ninth Circuit has established that "[n]o longer
can it be argued that any disagreement about a material
issue of fact precludes the use of summary judgment."
California Architectural Bldg. Products, Inc. v. Franciscan
Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987). More-
over, the United States Supreme Court has stated that
"[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under
Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
Indeed, "if the factual context makes the nonmoving
party's claim implausible, that party must come forward
with more persuasive evidence than would otherwise be
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necessary to show that there is a genuine issue for trial."
Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d at 1468 (emphasis in origi-
nal) (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587). Of course, all
evidence and inferences to be drawn therefrom must be
construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. See T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630-31.
DISCUSSION
I. Ripeness
Initially, the Court must determine whether Plain-
tiff's takings claim is ripe. As the Ninth Circuit noted in
Richardson, there are two hurdles to a regulatory taking
claim brought in federal court:
The first hurdle, . . . that the plaintiff obtain a
final decision regarding the application of the
regulation to the property at issue from the
entity charged with implementing the regula-
tion . . . does not apply to facial regulatory
takings claims .... The first hurdle thus does not
apply to [Plaintiff'sJ argument.
The second hurdle stems from the Fifth Amend-
ment's proviso that only takings without 'just
compensation' infringe that Amendment; 'if a
State provides adequate procedure for seeking
just compensation, the property owner cannot
claim a violation of the Just Compensation
clause until it has used the procedure and been
denied just compensation.'
Richardson, 124 F.3d at 1165. Because Chevron's argument
that Act 257 does not substantially advance a legitimate
state interest does not depend upon the extent to which
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Chevron is compensated, its facial regulatory taking
claim is ripe.
II. The "i'akin6s Clause
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution states: "IN]or shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." U.S. Const., Amend. V. The United States Supreme
Court has consistently distinguished "physical takings"
from "regulatory takings." A physical taking occurs when
a governmental entity authorizes a permanent physical
occupation of real property. See Yee v. City of Escondido,
503 U.S. 519, 535 (1992). By contrast, the regulatory taking
issue typically arises when a government regulation, such
as a zoning regulation or a rent control Ia_% affects a
property owner's ability to use his land. See id. In the
words of Justice Holmes, "while property may be regu-
lated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will
be recognized as a taking." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
The Court notes that it is well established that legis-
lative acts come to the Court with a presumption of
constitutionality, see Concrete Pipe & Products of California,
Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602,
637 (1993); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 83-84 (1978); Usery v. Turner
Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976), and therefore
Plaintiff faces an uphill battle in its challenge to Act 257.
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A. Facial Challense
When a party alleges that an act of the legislature
effects an unconstitutional taking, they may bring either a
"facial" challenge or an "as applied" challenge. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a land use regu-
lation will be found to effect a taking if it does not
substantially advance a legitimate state interest or denies
the landowner economically viable use of his land. See
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994); see also,
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016
(1992); Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 485 (1987); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980).
The relevant inquiry in a facial challenge is whether
"mere enactment" of the challenged regulation effects a
taking. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. For example, in Agins,
the city of Tiburon adopted zoning ordinances that lim-
ited development of appellant's five-acre lot to a maxi-
mum of five single-family residences. Appellants brought
suit against the city, alleging that the ordinances prohib-
ited all development of their land and thus effected a
taking of their property. The California Supreme Court
rejected appellants' request for a declaration that the
zoning ordinances were facially unconstitutional, holding
that the terms of the challenged ordinances allowed the
appellants to construct between one and five residences
on their property. See id. at 262.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and held that
the ordinances substantially advanced legitimate govern-
mental goals. See id. at 261. In reaching this decision, the
Court considered the benefits of the ordinances as well as
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any diminution in market value that the appellants might
suffer. The Court also considered appellants" allegations
that they wished to develop the land for residential pur-
poses, that the land was the most expensive suburban
property in the State, and that the best possible use of the
land was residential, and held that although the ordi-
nances limited development, they neither prevented the
best use of appellants' land or extinguished a fundamen-
tal attribute of ownership. The Court further held that the
general plan advanced a legitimate state interest - protec-
tion from urbanization. Finally, the Court noted that the
ordinance did not impose a burden solely on one land-
owner, it affected development generally, and therefore
the public did not benefit at the expense of a few. See id.
Similarly, in Richardson, the plaintiff brought a facial
challenge to a rent control ordinance that placed a cap on
renegotiated ground rent that could be charged by the
owner of the land under condominium units. See 124 F.3d
at 1163. The Ninth Circuit first considered the typical
condominium ground lease scheme, noting that since the
land underneath condominiums is ordinarily owned by
someone other than the condominium owner-occupant,
the condominium owner must lease the ground under-
neath the unit for long periods. The court went on to find
that although these leases are initially fixed for a term of
years, the rent is subject to renegotiation which typically
is based on a percentage of the fair market _'alue of the
land appurtenant to the unit, exclusive of improvements,
as of the date of the renegotiation. Finally, the court
recognized that the ordinance at issue was enacted
because the rapid rise in Hawaiian land prices often
resulted in renegotiated rents several hundred times
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greater than the initial fixed rent. Nonetheless, the Ninth
Circuit declared the ordinance facially invalid, holding
that the absence of a mechanism to prevent owner-occu-
pants from capturing a premium upon the resale of their
unit meant that the ordinance would not substantially
further its goal of creating affordable housing. See id. at
1166.
In the instant case, Plaintiff brings a facial challenge
to Act 257, arguing that the rent cap provision of the Act
effects an unconstitutional taking because it fails to sub-
stantially advance a legitimate state interest and it leaves
Plaintiff with no economically viable use of its land.
B. Applicable Standard in Resulatory Takings
Analysis
Defendants argue that Act 257 does not effect a tak-
ing, and is therefore constitutional. Moreover, Defendants
claim that Plaintiff is applying the wrong standard in
evaluating the state interest portion of the takings anal-
ysis.
According to Defendants, in order for the Act to pass
constitutional muster, it is not necessary that the Act
actually further the state interest involved, but merely
that the Legislature rationally could have believed that
the Act would do so. In support of this argument, Defen-
dants cite Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229
(1984). However, Midkiff dealt with a physical taking,
rather than a regulatqory taking, and is thus distinguish-
able from the present case. See id. at 233. In the physical
taking context, the government exercises its eminent
domain power to take" private property for "public use."
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Furthermore, once the government decides to physically
take property, it must provide just compensation to the
person from whom the property was taken. At issue in
Midkiff was the propriety of the purported "public use"
advanced by the government to justify the taking. See id.
at 235. The Midkiff Court held that the only requirement
in a physical taking, since the taking is fully compen-
sated, is that the legislature "rationally could have
believed" the taking would serve the purported "public
use." See id. at 242.
By contrast, the present case deals not with a physi-
cal taking, but with whether there has been a regulatory
taking, an inquiry which requires a different analysis. In
the regulatory taking context, the inquiry is not whether
property has been taken for a public use, but rather,
whether or not a government regulation substantially
advances a legitimate state interest. As clarified in Hall v.
City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 940 (1988):
In [Midkiff], the Court explored the meaning of
the public use requirement in the Fifth Amend-
ment's eminent domain clause .... The Court in
Midkiff did not address the somewhat different
articulation of the standard applicable in cases
where there was no deliberate exercise of the
eminent domain power. For example, it did not
mention Agins v. City of Tiburon . . . where it had
noted that "the application of a general zoning
law to a particular property effects a taking if
the ordinance does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests .... "The MidkiffCourt
left open the possibility that less deference
would be afforded where government does not
intend to effect a taking than where it does ....
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It makes considerable sense to give greater def-
erence to the legislature where it deliberately
resorts to its eminent domain power than where
it may have stumbled into exercising it through
actions that incidentally result in a taking.
Id. at 1280. The United States Supreme Court echoed this
viewpoint in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 835 (1987), when it stated:
We have required that the regulation [in the
takings context] "substantially advance" the
"legitimate state interest" sought to be achieved,
not that "the state could rationally have
decided" that the measure adopted might
achieve the State's objective.
Id. Finally, the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Richardson, a
case discussed by both parties in the instant case, further
clarified this concept:
The language used throughout Midkiff indicates
that deference to the legislative body's public
use determination is required when the taking is
fully compensated .... [W]e believe that Nollan-
Lucas-Dolan trio does not signal a change from
this longstanding rule of deference because we
see nothing inconsistent in applying heightened
scrutiny when the taking is uncompensated, and
a more deferential standard when the taking is
fully compensated.
124 F.3d at 1158. Thus, the Court finds that, in order to
determine whether the Act effects a taking, the appropri-
ate inquiry is whether the Act substantially advances a
legitimate state interest, not merely whether the legisla-
ture rationally believed it would do so.
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C. Advancement of a Legitimate State Interest
The United States Supreme Court has not elaborated
on the standards for determining what constitutes a
"legitimate state interest" or what type of connection
between a regulation and the state interest satisfies the
requirement that the former "substantially advance" the
latter. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834. However, the Court has
made clear that a broad range of governmental purposes
and regulations satisfies these requirements. See id.
1. State Interests to be Advanced
Before determining whether a legitimate state inter-
est is advanced by the Act, it is necessary to ascertain the
specific state interests involved. Plaintiff argues that the
purpose of Act 257 is to provide protection for service
station lessee dealers. Defendants, however, assert that
Act 257 is designed to protect consumers from the harm-
ful effects of the highly concentrated petroleum market in
Hawaii.
Defendants' contention is not without merit, for on
its face, Act 257 appears to be directed toward the protec-
tion of consumers. Section 1 of Act 257 reads, in pertinent
part:
(1) The petroleum industry is an essential ele-
ment of Hawaii's economy and is therefore of
vital importance to the health and welfare of all
people in the State of Hawaii; , . .
(4) Because Hawaii is a physically small and
geographically remote economy, certain of its
markets tend to be concentrated. Market con-
centration is a function of the number of firms
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in the market and their respective market
shares. In a highly concentrated market, market
prices tend to rise above competitive levels.
Market prices persistently above competitive levels
are harmful to consumers and the public. Barriers to
competition tend to cause supracompetitive
prices to persist; and
(5) The markets for oil and oil products in
Hawaii are highly concentrated markets.
Haw. Rev. Star. § 257 (1997) (emphasis added).
However, a closer examination of Act 257, speci-
fically its legislative history, reveals another interest,
namely "to provide certain protection for dealer operated
retail service stations." Conf, Comm. Rep. 38, H.B. No.
1451 (1997).
While these two interests appear to be distinct from
one another, they do not conflict. A thorough analysis of
Defendants' argument reveals that in order to further the
state's interest of protecting consumers, it is first neces-
sary to help lessee dealers, whose viability might lead to
a less concentrated - and thus more consumer friendly-
market. Thus, the Court finds that while the legislature
was mindful of the need to protect lessee dealers, this
consideration was essentially a step toward the ultimate
goal of reducing gasoline prices for Hawaii's consumers)
3 Even if the ultimate goal of the legislature was to help
lessee dealers, Act 257 would still fail to substantially advance
its purpose. As discussed below, incumbent lessee dealers can
capture the value of the reduced rent in the form of a premium,
thereby depriving incoming lessee dealers of the benefit of the
rent cap. Similarly, oil companies can offset any decrease in rent
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Having ascertained the state interests to be advanced by
Act 257, the Court's next task is to determine whether or
not these interests are substantially advanced.
2. Advancement of State Interests
In support of its motion for partial summary judg-
ment, Plaintiff argues that the Act fails to substantially
advance a legitimate state interest. The Court agrees with
Plaintiff, on two principal grounds.
a. New Dealers are Not Protected Because
Incumbent Dealers Can Capture the
Value of the Reduced Rent in the Form
of a Premium
Defendants argue that the savings realized from
reduced rent under the Act will lead to the continued
business viability of independent dealers, keeping them
in the market. They further argue that this, in turn, will
lead to a less concentrated market, giving consumers
more choices and lowering retail prices by way of
increased competition.
Plaintiff argues, and the Court agrees, that the rent
cap provision of the Act fails to protect new lessee
dealers because it allows incumbent dealers to capture
the value of the decreased rent in the form of a premium.
The existence of the rent cap makes an independent
with an increase in wholesale prices, and thereby eliminate the
benefit to the lessee dealer.
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dealer's leasehold interest in a service station more valu-
able, and this added value becomes especially significant
when an incumbent dealer undertakes to sell his interest.
See Stipulation of Facts, 19 34, 35 at 10-11. Since the Act
does not prohibit an incumbent dealer from selling his or
her service station lease, the rent cap provision enables
these dealers to sell their stations at a premium. See id. at
19 28, 29. Because the dealer to whom the interest is
transferred will be required to pay the premium, the
overall expense incurred by the incoming lessee dealer
remains the same, and as a result, there are no savings to
pass along to consumers.
In support of this argument, the Court finds Rich-
ardson, 124 E3d at 1150, controlling. In Richardson, the
Ninth Circuit addressed a rent control ordinance that
placed a cap on renegotiated ground rent that could be
charged by the owner of the land under condominium
units. The ordinance was enacted for the purpose of
providing affordable housing to owner-occupants. Id. at
1165. The trustees of the Bishop Estate, owner of the fee
simple title to the land underneath condominiums that
were affected by the ordinance, brought an action con-
testing the constitutionality of the ordinance. Since the
owner-occupant of a condominium was free to transfer
his or her "rent-controlled" leasehold interest, the owner-
occupant was able to capture the value of that rent cap in
the form of a premium. Id. at 1164. The ordinance was
challenged by the plaintiff as an unconstitutional taking.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding
that the ordinance effected a regulatory taking. According
to the Ninth Circuit, since the ordinance did not provide
a mechanism to prevent the lessees from capturing the
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premium, the state interest in providing affordable hous-
ing was not substantially advanced, as ultimately the
price of housing would remain the same. ld. at 1166.
Like Richardson, the possibility of a sales premium in
the case at bar prevents the state interests from being
substantially advanced. Act 257 fails to provide a mecha-
nism to prevent dealers from capturing a premium,
Indeed, cases like Yee and Hall suggest that it is inap-
propriate, if not unconstitutional, to fail to provide a
mechanism in rent control legislation to preclude the
capture of a premium. See Yee, 503 U.S. at 527-31; Hall, 833
F.2d at 1279-80. Moreover, the potential for a premium in
the present case is even more compelling than that in
Richardson, since it is likely that a lessee dealer will find it
easier to part with his or her business, than would a
homeowner with his or her home. Presumabl3; a home-
owner wishes to remain where he or she lives, whereas a
businessperson is likely to view maximization of profits
as the ultimate business goal. Thus, because an indepen-
dent dealer can unilaterally negate any benefit a trans-
feree might receive from the Act, it fails to substantially
advance the state's interest in protecting new dealers.
Defendants argue that Richardson is distinguishable
from the present case because the purpose of Ordinance
91-96, which was at issue in Richardson, and the purpose
of Act 257 are distinct. The primary goal of Ordinance
91-96 was to provide affordable housing for owner-occu-
pants of condominiums subject to ground leases. The
"Findings and Purpose" section of Ordinance 91-96
states, in relevant part:
)
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The council finds that:
(3) . . owner-occupants of condomin-
ium[s] . . . were not informed . . . of lease rent
renegotiation . . . terms . . . of the lease, [which
are] established unilaterally by the lessors .... ;
(5) . . . Unless controlled, the renegotiated
lease rents may be unaffordable to many owner-
occupants of leased condominium housing
units . . . ;
(6) ... owner-occupants may have no recourse
but to terminate their leases or sell.., and seek
housing elsewhere . . . ;
(7)(E) Residential leaseholds have also unde-
sirable social effects . . . [because] as the lessee
advances in age, [the] lessee's income potential
declines, . . . causing the lessee to give up the
lease . . . ;
The council further finds and declares:
(3) . . . lease rent increases of 1,000 percent
would make home ownership unaffordable to a
substantial number of owner-occupants of resi-
dential condominiums ....
Honolulu City and County, Haw. Ordinance 91-96 § 1.
Defendants argue that unlike the ordinance at issue in
Richardson, which was enacted to provide affordable
housing, the purpose of Act 257 is not to provide afford-
able gas station purchases, but rather, to benefit con-
sumers. Thus, even if transferee dealers are negatively
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impacted by a premium, according to Defendants, incum-
bent dealers will still benefit from the rent cap and will
thus pass along their savings to consumers, who will
thereby benefit as well. The Court disagrees.
First of all, in Richardson, although the owner-occu-
pants who retained their condominiums would clearly
receive a direct benefit from the rent cap each month, the
Ninth Circuit nonetheless declared the Ordinance uncon-
stitutional because it failed to prevent owners of condo-
miniums from capturing a premium upon the sale of their
units, thereby depriving the purchasers of any benefit
from the rent cap and resulting in the price of housing
ultimately remaining the same. Moreover, while it is pos-
sible that some lessee dealers may benefit from the Act's
rent cap in the form of lower overall costs, there is no
reason to conclude that such dealers will react to this
savings by lowering their retail prices. Dealers may
instead elect to maintain a higher profit margin, since the
Act includes no mechanism to pre,:ent lessee dealers
from simply keeping their prices the same and retaining
the profit from the reduced rent on a month-to-month
basis. Nothing has been presented to the contrary. 4
4 The parties agree that under current conditions, Act 257's
rent cap will only affect 11 of Chevron's 64 lessee dealer stations
in Hawaii. See Stipulation of Facts, _ 6 at 4. Thus, less than 20
percent of Chevron's stations will be impacted by the rent cap.
No evidence has been presented as to how the Act affects the
remaining non-Chevron stations.
The Court nonetheless finds that Act 257 fails to
substantially advance a legitimate state interest, because it is
probable that consumers will not benefit from the rent cap as
applied to these remaining stations. First, it is possible that, like
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b. Incumbent Dealers Are Not Protected
Because Rent Reductions Can Be Offset
By Wholesale Price Increases
Defendants also argue that since the rent cap provi-
sion of the Act helps incumbent dealers to maintain their
viability, the market will be less concentrated, giving the
consumer more choices. They go on to argue that this
lowered concentration means more competition and thus
lower retail prices. The Court finds it unlikely that the
Act will lead to such a result.
53 of Chevron's lessee dealer stations, the Act will not impact
these other stations at all. If this is the case, then the Act will
certainly not benefit consumers, since prices at these stations
will remain unchanged. Second, even if the Act were to impact
these stations, there is no mechanism to prevent incumbent
dealers from capturing a premium upon the sale of their
stations, as discussed at length above. Therefore, under either
scenario, Act 257 does not substantially advance the state's
interest in benefitting consumers. Furthermore, even in the
absence of a captured premium, the Act still fails to advance its
purpose. As discussed infra, and as acknowledged by the
government, Chevron can merely offset the decreased rent by
increasing their gasoline prices, thereby negating any benefit to
be achieved by the Act. The Court finds no reason why other oil
companies would not act likewise. In light of these
considerations, it is highly unlikely that the minimal number of
dealers who might be benefitted by the Act would make a
competitive impact if they were to lower their prices.
Finally, the fact that Act 257 allows Chevron to charge
approximately $1.1 million more than it would otherwise have
charged under its own rental program further demonstrates the
Act's ineffectiveness in its purpose of protecting consumers. See
Stipulation of Facts, Table 1.
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There is no dispute that Plaintiff receives income
from dealers in the form of both rent and fuel sales.
Importantly, the Act does not place any limitation on the
price of fuel sales. Thus, an oil company can raise fuel
prices to compensate for the reduction in rent, and as a
result, dealers will not receive any benefit from the rent
cap. $
Defendants argue that although oil companies are
free to raise fuel prices to offset any reduction in rent,
they will not do so. s Defendants' expert states that an
s In fact, Defendants have acknowledged this possibility in
their brief. Defendants' brief reads, in relevant part:
In contrast, Chevron's lessee dealer gas stations
provide Chevron with two sources of revenue.
Chevron uses both to pay the expenses it incurs in
leasing the service stations. The first source is the
contract rent that is subject to Act 257. The second
source of rever_ue is from the sale of Chevron gasoline
to lessee dealers which lessees are required to
purchase from Chevron under the supply agreement
Chevron requires of the dealer lessees. The revenue
which Chevron receives from its gasoline sales is
substantially greater than the contract rent. Act 257
does not impose a cap on the amount Chevron may
charge for gasoline and other products it sells its
lessee dealers. Therefore, Act 257 does not deprive
Chevron of the ability to increase the DTW price,
Chevron's primary revenue stream from its lessee
stations, in the event of an increase in costs.
See Def.'s Mot. for Summ.J., p. 28-29 (citations omitted).
6 Plaintiff's expert disagrees. It is evident from Plaintiff's
expert's declaration that this can and will occur in response to a
reduction in rent. See Declaration of John R. Umbeck, p. 3,
5(b); p. 8, '1 16; p. 11, _ 21. According to Plaintiff's expert, Act
257 will (1) penalize Chevron and its lessee dealers, reducing
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increase in wholesale fuel prices by an oil company
would lead the dealer to increase his retail fuel prices.
This increased retail price, according to Defendants,
would result in a decreased volume of fuel sales, which
would ultimately hurt the oil company. However, Defen-
dants' expert fails to explain why the oil company would
not increase the wholesale price to simply offset the
decrease in rent. 7 Indeed, there is no economic reason
why a shift from paying a certain sum as "rent" to paying
that same sum as "fuel price" would lead a dealer to react
by raising his gas prices when his overall costs remain
the same. By doing so, he would be acting against his
own interest, running the risk of decreased sales because
of the increased prices. Instead, it is likely that if a
dealer's overall costs remain the same, he will choose to
remain competitive by keeping his retail prices the same.
Because oil companies can simply raise their wholesale
prices to the same extent that rent decreases, the dealer is
likely to be unaffected by the rent cap, and gas prices will
their viability in Hawaii; (2) penalize consumers because it can
be expected to lead to higher retail gasoline prices; (3) not
benefit future lessee dealers because dealers can capture the
value of the rent cap in the form of a premium; and (4) not
permit Chevron to earn a reasonable return on its investments.
See id. at p. 3, _ 5. By contrast, Defendants' expert claims that
Act 257 will (1) benefit consumers by decreasing the
concentration in the gasoline market; (2) benefit both incumbent
and transferee dealers; and (3) provide Chevron a reasonable
return on its investment. See Declaration of Keith B. Leffler, p.
4-5, _ 7.
7 Neither Defendants nor Defendants' expert have offered
any reason why this is not a feasible, and even likely, result.
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remain unchanged. 8 Consequentl3, _ the Act's purpose of
protecting the dealer - and thereby protecting the con-
sumer - would not be met.
Since Chevron's Dealer Supply Contract allows a les-
see dealer to purchase fuel from suppliers other than
Chevron, one might argue that if Chevron were to offset
the decreased rent as described above, a dealer would
simply "go elsewhere" to purchase his fuel. However, the
Court finds that this is neither a feasible nor practical
alternative. First, the terms of the Dealer Supply Contract
state that a lessee dealer must purchase from Chevron all
fuel that is necessary to fulfill customer demand for
Chevron gasoline. Thus, even if a dealer wishes to dis-
continue Chevron gasoline and sell another brand, he
may not do so if a demand for Chevron gasoline exists.
Second, according to the Dealer Lease, if a lessee dealer
chooses to market and sell other gasoline, he must install
his own pumps and tanks, and he must make it clear to
consumers that the fuel contained therein is not Chevron
fuel. As stipulated to by the parties, there are only two
local refinery sources: Chevron, which supplies sixty per-
cent of the gasoline produced or refined in Hawaii, and
Tesoro, which supplies forty percent. See Stipulation of
Although Defendants might argue that an oil company
may not be able to accurately assess the amount of increase in
wholesale price needed to offset the decrease in rental income,
the parties agree that, where an economic benefit or loss is
difficult to quantify, on average, the participants will estimate
accurately. See Declaration of Keith B. I.effler, p. 11-12, 't 16
(discussing accuracy of estimating value of rent cap in order to
calculate premium); Declaration of JohnR. Umbeck, p. 12, _ 22; p.
13, _ 24 (discussing estimation of rent cap value).
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Facts, _ 38 at 11. Therefore, if a dealer chose to obtain
gasoJine from another source, it would be cost-prohib-
itive without some sort of "concerted action," since
importing gasoline requires purchasing a large quantity
and chartering a vessel to transport it. Because this is not
a realistic alternative, the Court finds that a lessee
dealer's mere ability to purchase fuel from other sources
does not negate the probability that an oil company such
as Chevron and Tesoro could be successful in defeating
the rent cap by offsetting decreased rent with increased
fuel prices.
For all of the reasons outlined above, the Court finds
that Section 3(c) of Act 257 fails to substantially advance a
legitimate state interest, and as such, effects an uncon-
stitutional taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution.9, _0
9 While the Court recognizes that Plaintiff brings a facial
challenge: to Act 257, the Court notes that Act 257 has been in
operation since June of 1997, and yet the state claims in its
lawsuit filed on October 1, 1998, which alleges antitrust
violations, that the price of gasoline for consumers is an average
of $.30 per gallon higher than prices on the mainland. This
further illustrates the ineffectiveness of Act 257 in its purpose of
benefitting consumers. However, the Court has not considered
the foregoing in reaching its decision.
10 Plaintiff also challenges the Act as effecting an
unconstitutional taking on two alternate grounds: (1) that it
leaves them with no economically viable use of their land, and
(2) that the Act falls to provide for individualized consideration.
Because the Court finds that the Act fails to substantially
advance a legitimate state interest, it need not address these
alternate arguments.
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III. Other Claims
Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment only
on its Second Claim for Relief, while Defendants moved
for summary judgment on all claims. Defendants failed to
satisfy their burden on Plaintiff's First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Claims for Relief, because they
did not present any evidence which demonstrates that
there is no genuine issue of material fact as to those
claims. This is particularly true with regard to Plaintiff's
First Claim for Relief (Deprivation of Constitutional
Rights in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983) and Fifth Claim
for Relief (impermissible taking in violation of the Hawaii
Constitution), inasmuch as the Court finds that Act 257
effects an unconstitutional taking. Accordingly, summary
judgment on those claims is DENIED.
In their brief, Defendants represented that Plaintiff
"announced" that it would not pursue its due process
and equal protection claims. However, the Court does not
find anything in the record which indicates that Plaintiff
abandoned these claims. If it can be established that
Plaintiff did make such a withdrawal, Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on the Third, Fourth,
Sixth, and Seventh Claims for Relief.
CONCLUSION
The Court finds that Act 257 fails to substantially
advance a legitimate state interest, and as such, effects an
unconstitutional taking in violation of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS
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Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on its Second
Claim for Relief.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, NOV 10 1998.
/s/ Alan C. Kay
Chief United States
District Judge
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Pennsylvania Corporation,
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v. D.C.No.
BENJAMIN J. CAYETANO, CV-97-00933-ACK
Governor of the State of
Hawaii; EARL I. ANZAI*, ORDER
Attorney General of the
State of Hawaii, (Filed Oct. 28, 2000)
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: D.W. NELSON, BEEZFR, and W. FLETCHER,
Circuit Judges.
The majority of the panel has voted unanimously to
deny the petition for rehearing. Judge W. Fletcher voted
to grant the petition for rehearing. Judges D. Nelson and
Beezer recommend denying the petition for rehearing en
banc. Judge W. Fletcher votes to grant the petition for
rehearing en banc.
The full court has been advised of the suggestion for
rehearing en banc and no judge in active service has
requested a vote to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R.
App. P. 35.
Earl I. Anzai is substituted for his predecessor Margery
S. Bronster, as Attorney General for the State of Hawaii. Fed. R.
App. P. 43/c_,(2).
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The petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc are
DENIED.
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App. P. 43(c)(2).
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The petitionsforrehearingand rehearingen banc are
DENIED.
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STATUTE INVOLVED
Hawaii Revised Statutes, Chapter. 486H-10.4 (1997), pro-
vides in pertinent part:
(c) All leases as part of a franchise as defined in
section 486H-1, existing on August 1, 1997, or entered
into thereafter, shall be construed in conformity with the
following:
(1) Such renewal shall not be scheduled more
frequently than once every three years; and
(2) Upon renewal, the lease rent payable shall
not exceed fifteen percent of the gross sales, except for
gasoline, which shall not exceed fifteen percent of the
gross profit of product, excluding 11 related taxes by the
dealer operated retail service station as defined in section
486H-1 and [this section] plus, in the case of a retail
service station at a location where the manufacturer or
jobber is the lessee and not the owner of the ground lease,
a percentage increase equal to any increase which the
manufacturer or jobber is required to pay the lessor
under the ground lease for the service station. For the
purpose of this subsection, "gross amount" means all
monetary earnings of the dealer from a dealer operated
retail station after all applicable taxes, excluding income
taxes, are paid. The provisions of this subsection shall not
apply to any existing contracts that may be in conflict
with its provisions.
(d) Nothing in this section shall prohibit a dealer
from selling a retail service station in any manner.
